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USING STATE-BASED ADEQUACY NOW, 
NATIONAL ADEQUACY OVER TIME TO 
ANTICIPATE AND DEFEAT SCHREMS III 
Abstract: Consequent to their incongruous developments of data privacy law, 
the European Union and United States have struggled to lawfully trade data with 
one another. Both nevertheless aspire to make the transfers occur. Therefore, they 
have negotiated two agreements for lawful data trade: (1) Safe Harbor and (2) 
Privacy Shield. But the European Union has also required the United States to 
guarantee nearly “equivalent” protections to its own. Given the Court of Justice 
of the European Union’s decisions in Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner 
(Schrems I) and Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Ltd. 
(Schrems II) to invalidate the agreements, achieving the equivalency requirement 
will be demanding. This Note contends that the upcoming successor agreement 
should allow well-suited states in the United States to obtain “adequacy” deter-
minations for themselves, rather than trying to adapt the structurally dissimilar 
federal legislation to meet European Union standards. This approach is the only 
realistic way to anticipate and defeat an inevitable “Schrems III” court challenge. 
INTRODUCTION 
Today’s hottest commodity on the transatlantic trade market, personal da-
ta, has all but eliminated the greatest concern faced by its predecessors: getting 
from the shore of one continent to another. 1 But the resolution to this problem 
has merely sowed the seed of a new hurdle. 2 Although recent advances in 
technology have made trading personal information via data more effortless  
and immediate, its transfer poses an unsettling question—what can happen to 
the information once it has arrived?3 
                                                                                                          
 1 See Daniel Alvarez, Safe Harbor Is Dead; Long Live the Privacy Shield?, A.B.A. (May 20, 2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2016/05/09_alvarez/ [https://perma.
cc/B5V5-K8UZ] (commenting on the history of transatlantic travel); Václav Janeček, Trade in Data: 
Constructive Limits of Personal Data Ownership, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (May 31, 2018), https://
www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/05/trade-data-constructive-limits-personal-data-
ownership [https://perma.cc/VK4P-NYDV] (commenting on the economic viability of trading person-
al data). Centuries ago, it could take several months for a traded good to travel between Europe and 
the United States (US). Alvarez, supra. In contrast, a data point can travel from one side of the Atlan-
tic to the other at the “speed of light.” Id. 
 2 See DEBORAH HURLEY, POLE STAR: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 12–13 
(2003) (connecting the advances in modern technology with the concern for their ability to spread the 
information they collect). 
 3 See id. at  12, 19 (describing technology, and thus the data it produces, to be “ubiquitous” and 
increasingly troublesome); Alvarez, supra note 1 (admiring just how fast transatlantic trade has be-
come). 
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The European Union (EU) and United States (US) have been embroiled 
in a conflict to determine the best answer to this question for decades.4 Alt-
hough both agree that personal data is private, and thus deserves protection, 
they disagree about the measures necessary to guarantee individuals this right.5 
Consequently, they have had to negotiate a middle ground to allow personal 
data to remain on the transatlantic trade market. 6 
Despite both governments’ attempts to reach a compromise, Austrian pri-
vacy activist Maximillian Schrems has twice thwarted their efforts.7 Finding 
victory before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) both in 
2015, in Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner (Schrems I), and in 2020, 
in Data Protection Commissioner of Ireland v. Facebook Ireland Ltd. (Schrems 
II), Schrems wiped out two agreements that previously allowed the EU and US 
to trade data, Safe Harbor and Privacy Shield. 8 Left without a valid transatlan-
tic agreement, companies have had to implement unpredictable and potentially 
inapplicable “mechanisms” to make such transfers.9 Unfortunately for busi-
nesses, even an unknowingly improper use of European data can result in ex-
tremely harsh financial backlash. 10 Although the Department of Commerc e 
                                                                                                          
 4 See Owen McCoy, A Legislative Comparison: US vs. EU on Data Privacy, EUR. INTERACTIVE 
DIGIT. ADVERT. ALL. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://edaa.eu/a-legislative-comparison-us-vs-eu-on-data-
privacy/ [https://perma.cc/7T3A-3QZ9] (contrasting the way that the European Union (EU) and US 
have developed privacy legislation to best protect personal information and its transfers). 
 5 EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework Principles Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
PRIV. SHIELD FRAMEWORK, https://www.privacyshield.gov/servlet/servlet.FileDownload?file015t
00000004qAg [https://perma.cc/U2DS-HMLK]. 
 6 See MARTIN A. WEISS & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44257, U.S.-EU DA TA 
PRIVACY: FROM SAFE HARBOR TO PRIVACY SHIELD 1, 4 (2016) (explaining the need for the two  
governments to negotiate a way to continue data trade between themselves). 
 7 See Case C–311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. (Schrems II), ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, 
¶ 201 (July 16, 2020) (invalidating the Privacy Shield framework); Case C–362/14, Schrems v. Data 
Prot. Comm’r (Schrems I), ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 106 (Oct. 6, 2015) (invalidating the Safe Harbor 
framework). Maximillian Schrems originally grew concerned with data privacy as a law student in 
California. Interview by James Jacoby with Max Schrems, Priv. Advoc. (Mar. 28, 2018) (transcript 
available at https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/interview/max-schrems/ [https://perma.cc/TVU6-
EHF3]). During one of his classes, a Facebook, Inc. (Facebook) representative commented that, alt-
hough the EU had privacy regulations, the company did not follow them because the EU did not actu-
ally prosecute the laws. Id. This sparked Schrems to examine EU privacy law and data practices of the 
popular social media platforms he used. Id. Deeply disturbed with the results of his inquiries, Schrems 
chose to act and eventually sued Facebook. Id. 
 8 See Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 201 (ending the applicability of the Privacy Shield 
mechanism); Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 106 (terminating the Safe Harbor mechanism). 
 9 See Davide Szép, America’s Tech Giants: It’s Back to the Drawing Board on European Data, 
92 N.Y. STATE BAR J. 45, 46 (2020) (commenting that any US organization that still seeks to collect 
data from the EU must do so via an “alternative mechanism[]”). The most common alternative mech-
anisms that businesses use to obtain data from the EU are “Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs)” and 
“Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs).” Id.; see also infra notes 144–147 and accompanying text (sum-
marizing how to use SCCs and BCRs to make lawful data transfers). 
 10 See Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April  
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
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commented in August 2020 on the possibility of developing a new and more 
compliant agreement with the EU, it remained silent on how it could accom-
plish this goal. 11 Thus, with Schrems III being not only predictable but inevita-
ble, how can the US guarantee the success of the third transatlantic data trans-
fer agreement?12 
This Note contends that the reason for the invalidation of both Safe Har-
bor and Privacy Shield is inherent in the inability to disguise the US’s sectoral 
data privacy system as one comparable to the EU’s omnibus legislation. 13 It 
remains imperative to quickly find a balance between the strict standards of the 
EU and the sectoral structure of US law to fulfill the economic needs of both 
parties. 14 But it is unlikely that they can achieve a meaningful degree of equiv-
                                                                                                          
Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regula-
tion), art. 83(2)(b), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 82 (considering, but not excluding, the awareness that the 
business had when calculating fines for a misuse of EU data); GDPR Fines Database—List of Fines, 
INT’L NETWORK OF PRIV. L. PROS., https://gdpr-fines.inplp.com/list/ [https://perma.cc/9BP9-YHUJ] 
(listing General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) fines that range from several hundred euros to 
several million). For example, an individual in Austria was fined €2,200 for use of a personal security 
camera which recorded public entry ways to a residential building. GDPR Fines Database—List of 
Fines, supra. 
 Acknowledging that not all European countries belong to the EU, this Note uses the word “Euro-
pean” to refer only to EU countries and their citizens. Compare Countries, EUR. UNION, https://europa.
eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en [https://perma.cc/FB8D-Z2ZC] (listing the countries be-
longing to the EU), with Countries of Europe, NATIONS ONLINE, https://www.nationsonline.org/
oneworld/europe.htm [https://perma.cc/CYE4-3R9L] (listing all European countries). 
 11 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Com., Joint Press Statement from U.S. Secretary of Com-
merce Wilbur Ross and European Commissioner for Justice Didier Reynders (Aug.  1 0 , 2 0 20) , 
https://useu.usmission.gov/joint-press-statement-from-u-s-secretary-of-commerce-wilbur-ross-and-
european-commissioner-for-justice-didier-reynders/ [https://perma.cc/D56L-TJ52] (detailing the col-
lective and public response made by the EU and US in response to the Schrems II decision). The par-
ties stated that they had merely begun to consider replacing Privacy Shield. Id. The released statement 
suggested that the world’s economic environment might play a role in the necessity to find a new way 
to lawfully trade data. See id. (referencing the importance of finding “prosperity” during a time of  
significant struggle). 
 12 See HENDRIK MILDEBRATH, EUR. PARL. RSCH. SERV., PE 652.073, THE CJEU JUDGMENT IN 
THE SCHREMS II CASE (2020), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2020/652073/
EPRS_ATA(2020)652073_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BQR-M38P] (acknowledging that Schrems’ 
proposed course of action is not likely to occur before a replacement to Privacy Shield is m ade) .  
Schrems suggested that the US must change its surveillance law to continue to trade data with the EU. 
Id. That result, nevertheless, is unlikely to happen. See id. (claiming there was not enough time to  
accomplish this feat). Although it  remains unclear when to expect a new agreement, m aking t he 
changes that Schrems proposes would require a complete “overhaul” of current US law that would 
take a considerable amount of time and effort. Id. 
 This Note does not use the term “Schrems III” to reference or suggest the current existence of 
such a case, but rather to predict the likelihood of such a case upon the development of a new transat-
lantic data privacy transfer mechanism. See generally Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 201 (end-
ing the validity of the Privacy Shield mechanism); Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 106 (voiding 
the Safe Harbor mechanism). 
 13 See infra notes 22–260 and accompanying text. 
 14 See Cassandra Liem et al., The Economic Value of Personal Data for Online Platforms, Firms 
and Consumers, RUEGEL (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.bruegel.org/2016/01/the-economic-value-of-
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alence at a national level before a potential Schrems III challenge. 15 This Note 
suggests that the US should draft an adequacy agreement that is state-specific, 
focusing on the individual states with privacy standards most similar to those 
in the EU. 16 In this way, the US could take a piecemeal approach that could 
effectuate a nationwide mechanism for transatlantic personal data trade over 
time. 17Allowing a state like California to obtain individual adequacy might 
incentivize the US as a whole to raise its privacy standard and achieve nation-
wide adequacy over time. 18 
Part I of this Note introduces the conflicting privacy protection approach-
es taken by the EU and US that led to the ultimate demises of the previous two 
transatlantic data transfer agreements, Safe Harbor and Privacy Shield.19 Part 
II contemplates the current strive for a future privacy agreement and surveys 
US privacy laws on the state level. 20 Part III proposes that negotiating multiple 
state-specific adequacy determinations, rather than a single nationwide one, is 
necessary to a new agreement’s success and the continued trade of data be-
tween the EU and US. 21 
I. HARBOR DRAINED, SHIELD LOWERED: SCHREMS MAKES DEVELOPING A 
TRANSATLANTIC DATA PRIVACY AGREEMENT A LOSING BATTLE 
Privacy is a long-recognized right that is necessary to the global commu-
nity. 22 But privacy concerns have recently grown as individuals more regularly 
                                                                                                          
personal-data-for-online-platforms-firms-and-consumers/ [https://perma.cc/3QLK-VG66] (showing 
the monetary benefit that data brings to different stakeholders). The economic advantages of data  
trading may be reflected in the revenue that advertising brings to businesses. See id. (explaining the 
“advertising revenues per user” calculation and its significance). Businesses can use personal data to 
better tailor advertisements to users of a platform, and in turn, the users are more likely to click on the 
advertisement. Id. As a result , data trading is a lucrative venture for the business. See id. (giving the 
example of Facebook’s extreme growth in advertising-based revenue over time). 
 15 See MILDEBRATH, supra note 12 (recognizing that what might be the best course of action for 
the US is not necessarily a practical one); see also infra notes 22–260 and accompanying text (show-
ing that national adequacy is unlikely to occur in the near future because the US’s privacy structure is 
deeply incompatible with the EU’s). Schrems recently developed an organization,  aptly  n am ed 
“noyb,” an abbreviation for “none of your business,” to pursue data privacy cases like Schrems I and 
Schrems II. Max Schrems Launches a New NGO That Is None of Your Business, GDPR INFORMER (Jan. 
25, 2018), https://gdprinformer.com/news/max-schrems-launches-new-ngo-none-business [https://
perma.cc/B6ZF-XJ4T]; Our Detailed Concept, NYOB, https://noyb.eu/en/our-detailed-concept [https://
perma.cc/5SFS-XMGA] (explaining the organization’s goals and practices). 
 16 See infra notes 216–260 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 232–260 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 232–260 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 22–154 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 155–215 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 216–260 and accompanying text. 
 22 See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12 (Dec. 10, 1948)  
(recognizing that a person has a natural-born right to withhold certain information from others); Debo-
rah Hurley, Taking the Long Way Home: The Human Right of Privacy, in PRIVACY IN THE MODERN 
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divulge their personal information, called “personal data.”23 “Personal data” 
refers to any statistic or detail that pertains to the identity of a person. 24 This 
                                                                                                          
AGE: T HE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 70, 72 (Marc Rotenberg et al. eds., 2015) (explaining the global 
acknowledgement of privacy as a human right over seventy years ago); see also Hurley, supra, at 72 
(stating that the safekeeping of private information promotes “autonomy, self-determination,  an d 
dignity”). In the mid-twentieth century, two international documents declared a fundamental right to 
not have one’s privacy unjustifiably invaded. See Hurley, supra, at 72 (referencing the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). In 1993, the 
World Conference on Human Rights made clear that “human rights” were absolute and applicable to 
the entire human population. World Conference and the Vienna Declaration, BBC WORLD SERV., 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/features/ihavearightto/four_b/treaties_vienna.sh tml 
[https://perma.cc/ZJ48-YXK4]. During this conference, a significant majority of recognized sovereign 
countries signed a commitment to further these human rights globally. See id. (stating that 171 nations 
were party to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action); see also Growth in United Nations 
Membership, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/growth-in-un-membership [https://
perma.cc/QEJ8-V3JX] (recognizing the existence of 184 member states in 1993). Advances in tech-
nology have also changed the nature of privacy concerns over time. Compare Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 349 (1967) (providing a Fourth Amendment privacy case that questioned the legality of 
police using wiretap technology to obtain information without the individual’s knowledge) ,  with  
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (exemplifying an older Fourth Amendment priva-
cy case that focused on the marital privacy rights of a married woman and her ability to use birth con-
trol). In Katz, the Supreme Court extended Fourth Amendment protection beyond the previous re-
quirement that “physical intrusion” was necessary to be a violation. 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., con-
curring). It, thus, forbade the abuse of wiretap technology to breach an individual’s private conversa-
tions. Id. at 359 (majority opinion). As the Court noted, individuals have a “general right to privacy” 
and a “right to be let alone.” Id. at 350. 
 23 See HURLEY, supra note 2, at 19, 24 (explaining that data is omnipresent). By 2020, there was 
more data than visible stars. Branka Vuleta, How Much Data Is Created Every Day? [27 Staggering 
Stats], SEEDSCIENTIFIC (Jan. 28, 2021), https://seedscientific.com/how-much-data-is-created-every-
day/ [https://perma.cc/76FU-FG4T]; Data Never Sleeps 8.0, DOMO, https://www.domo.com/learn/info
graphic/data-never-sleeps-8 [https://perma.cc/YZ3G-TCLF] (claiming that the world produces mil-
lions of different data records in just one minute). 
 Although people should decide what they do or do not share with outsiders, recent innovations 
have reduced the ability to safekeep personal data. See HURLEY, supra note 2, at 19, 24 (describing 
the ability of technology to dissipate information). For example, without the existence of technology, 
much of an individual’s personal information remains relatively private, unless the individual directly 
chooses to share it . See Mary Atamaniuk, 20 Years in Digital Privacy: How the Definition Has 
Evolved, CLARIO (July 3, 2020), https://clario.co/blog/privacy-definition-over-years/ [https://perma.
cc/XJ6U-JFGJ] (explaining that for much of history, privacy protection was as straightforward as not 
telling others your secrets). Thus, individuals acted as the gatekeeper to their own privacy. Id. The 
decision to reveal any such information, therefore, inherently reduced the expectation to it remaining 
private. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (explaining that the willing disclosures 
made to a phone company delegitimized the individual’s claim to privacy over his telephone history). 
This is far less applicable in today’s technology-dominated environment, wherein personal in for -
mation can be collected and disseminated without the individual’s knowledge. See Carpenter v. Unit-
ed States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2261–63 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (claiming that newer technology 
has become so integrated into our daily lives and holds such deeply personal information that it limits 
the practicality of older privacy doctrines); see also HURLEY, supra note 2, at 19 (acknowledging the 
sheer amount of data collection); Atamaniuk, supra (noting that, over time, companies have become 
increasingly skilled at using their customers’ personal information). Even people who do not intend to 
create personal data do so. See Atamaniuk, supra (commenting that t he  in famous Facebo o k-
Cambridge Analytica data abuse involved many individuals who were oblivious to data practices). 
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broad category of information has a vast range of uses that have proven to be 
incredibly lucrative. 25 Nevertheless, the incentives to expansively use personal 
data strain against the potential risks it poses to human rights. 26 To uphold their 
                                                                                                          
Everyday actions like turning on a lightbulb or using a car’s navigation service generate data related to 
that individual. See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Fowler, What Does Your Car Know About You? We Hacked a 
Chevy to Find Out., WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/
12/17/what-does-your-car-know-about-you-we-hacked-chevy-find-out/ [https://perma.cc/WU2U-
S8H2] (explaining that a car’s internal computer, like any other computer, can and does collect infor-
mation on the driver); These LED Smart Lights Are Tracking Your Moves, CBS NEWS (June 30, 2014), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/technology-in-led-smart-lights-raises-privacy-concerns/ [https://
perma.cc/9HXT-5NEF] (providing an example of a lightbulb that was praised for its energy-saving 
capabilit ies and was also collecting data on its users). 
 24 INFO. COMM’R’S OFF., GUIDE TO THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (GDPR) 9–
10 (2021), https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-
data-protection-regulation-gdpr-1-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/E85E-6CYG]. See generally Regulation 
(EU) 2016/679, supra note 10 (laying out the provisions of the EU’s omnibus GDPR legislation) . 
Many different types of information concerning an individual can be used to ascertain their identity. 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 10, art. 4, at 33. For example, personal data includes infor-
mation like: a “name,” government “identification number,” “location,” and even biometric infor-
mation. Id. 
 25 See MATTHEW NORTH, DATA MINING FOR THE MASSES 13 (2012) (ebook) (listing everyday 
activities like buying food, filling the gas tank, going out to dinner, or picking up mail that can all  
create a digital footprint of an individual); Liem et al., supra note 14 (stating that data and its use is a 
multi-billion-dollar industry and is growing). On a macroscopic level, an aggregate of data can predict 
general patterns and trends. See NORTH, supra, at 14 (examining how a business can amass data to 
generate profiles for the preferences of different demographics of its customers). By connecting data 
points, retailers can determine which products are most popular and where to sell certain products. See 
id. (exemplifying how a grocery store might benefit from requiring shoppers to provide their location 
and sex when they acquire a membership card for discount eligibility). Simultaneously, it  can give 
incredibly detailed insight to the preferences and demographics of a single individual. See id. (com-
menting that the same information can be used to tailor an advertisement to an individual). 
 26 See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 22, art. 12 (claiming privacy protection to be fundamen-
tally important); Kari Paul, Americans’ Data Is Worth Billions—and You Soon Might Be Able to Get a 
Cut of It, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/americans-data-is-
worth-billions-and-you-soon-might-be-able-to-get-a-cut-of-it-2018-10-09 [https://perma.cc/AU99-
NZBZ] (claiming that corporations like Instagram and Twitter can sell their users’ personal infor -
mation to advertisers for billions of dollars each year). Although many processors and collectors are 
likely well-intentioned, the inherent nature and sheer volume of information welcomes the possibility 
for misuse. See Bernard Marr, How Much Data Do We Create Every Day? The Mind-Blowing Stats 
Everyone Should Read, FORBES (May 21, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/
05/21/how-much-data-do-we-create-every-day-the-mind-blowing-stats-everyone-should-read/?sh=
2d19600660ba [https://perma.cc/AH3G-P76K] (commenting on the extremely large amount of data 
that an individual person creates). Some breaches of personal information may be potentially more 
detrimental than others. See, e.g., Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fines Wells Fargo $100 
Million for Widespread Illegal Practice of Secretly Opening Unauthorized Accounts, CONSUMER FIN. 
PROT. BUREAU (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consum er-
financial-protection-bureau-fines-wells-fargo-100-million-widespread-illegal-practice-secretly-
opening-unauthorized-accounts/ [https://perma.cc/AT2Q-8NFL] (presenting the extreme abuse made 
by a financial agency when it opened unauthorized accounts by using data that it had collected on its 
members). See generally Jim Zarroli, Wells Fargo’s Unauthorized Accounts Likely Hurt Customer’s 
Credit Scores, NPR (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/09/26/495501008/wells- fargos-
unauthorized-accounts-likely-hurt-customers-credit-scores [https://perma.cc/DY5J-J5GK] (criticizing 
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commitment to the fundamental right to privacy, countries have developed leg-
islation to offset dangerous data abuses.27 Although most countries have prom-
ulgated strong privacy legislation for their constituents, they have not neces-
sarily done so in similar ways. 28 
While developing their own personal data privacy protection systems, the 
EU and US diverged into two incongruous systems that have since throttled 
transatlantic data transfer. 29 As a result, they have struggled to find a mecha-
nism that allows seamless and lawful transfers of EU data to the US. 30 Section 
                                                                                                          
the company’s privacy violation for the damage done to its customers by deteriorating their personal 
financial leverage). 
 27 See generally World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993), (providing the agreement of nations to guarantee 
human rights across the globe); Data Protection and Privacy Legislation Worldwide, UNCTAD,  
https://unctad.org/page/data-protection-and-privacy-legislation-worldwide [https://perma.cc/RCE2-
MMJV] (demonstrating that two-thirds of countries in the world have privacy legislation in place and 
another tenth that have initiated legislation to come). National privacy laws purport to safeguard the 
integrity of personal data far beyond its initial disclosure. See Fair Information Practice Principles, 
IAPP, https://iapp.org/resources/article/fair-information-practices/ [https://perma.cc/Z2J6-WPF4] (listing 
eight nonbinding Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) that reflect several best practices for 
data before and after collection); FIPPs, NIST, https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/FIPPs [http s://
perma.cc/647K-839W] (defining FIPPs as a set of exemplary concepts that promote better privacy 
legislation across the world). The FIPPs first gained traction in the 1970s. FIPPs, supra. They suggest 
that entities: (1) minimize the amount data that they collect, (2) maintain only high caliber data, (3) 
divulge their reason to collect data accurately, (4) obtain user consent, (5) secure the personal infor-
mation, (6) be forthcoming about their data practices, (7) provide individuals with rights to their own 
information, and (8) meaningfully adhere to the preceding practices. Fair Information Practice Prin-
ciples, supra. 
 28 See What’s Data Privacy Law in Your Country?, PRIV. POL’YS, https://www.privacypolicies.
com/blog/privacy-law-by-country/ [https://perma.cc/7YVG-ETZB] (Sept. 4, 2019) (providing infor-
mation about the status of various countries’ current regulations). For example, in New Zealand, data 
collectors must gather personal information straight from the user and provide reciprocal information 
about the collector. Id. Meanwhile, India requires websites to include a privacy policy that details 
what type of information they collect and where that information may go after collection. Id. 
 29 See W. Gregory Voss, Obstacles to Transatlantic Harmonization of Data Privacy Law in Con-
text, 2019 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 405, 407, 410 (bringing attention to the lack of similarity be-
tween the EU’s and US’s frameworks); EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework Principles Issued by the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, supra note 5 (acknowledging that, by developing a “sectoral” data 
privacy framework, the US has distinguished itself from the EU). Notably, the lack of conformity  
between privacy laws at any level can cause issues or obstruct the free flow of data. See Voss, supra, 
at  410 (claiming that the success of data trade depends on the analogousness of privacy regulations); 
see also Nicholas Blackmore, Feeling Inadequate? Why Adequacy Decisions Are Rare (and May Get 
Rarer) in Asia-Pacific, KENNEDYS (Mar. 26, 2019), https://kennedyslaw.com/thought-leadership/
article/feeling-inadequate-why-adequacy-decisions-are-rare-and-may-get-rarer-in-asia-pacific/ [https://
perma.cc/2ETE-SG5U] (commenting on the struggle faced by Asian-Pacific countries, with the sole 
exception of Japan, to obtain adequacy determinations given their privacy regimes). 
 30 See Case C–311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. (Schrems II), ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, 
¶ 201 (July 16, 2020) (making the Privacy Shield agreement inoperable); Case C–362/14, Schrems v. 
Data Prot. Comm’r (Schrems I), ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 106 (Oct. 6, 2015) (demonstrating the simi-
lar result  in the court challenge to the Safe Harbor agreement). Although alternative mechanisms do 
exist, it  is not necessarily clear how to properly or uniformly use them. See MILDEBRATH, supra note 
12 (noting that there is no universally applicable answer to the usability of SCCs made in the Schrems 
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A of this Part discusses the tension between personal freedoms and economic 
interests that is inherent to data privacy regulation. 31 Section B juxtaposes the 
EU’s omnibus approach to privacy law with the US’s sectoral one. 32 Section C 
provides background to the development and demise of the first agreement 
aimed to resolve the tension, Safe Harbor. 33 Section D introduces its most re-
cent successor, Privacy Shield, and chronicles its similar fate. 34 
A. Perfectly Private? Governments Weigh Individual Privacy  
Rights with National Economic Proclivities 
In the twenty-first century, data collection has become common in the av-
erage person’s life and a token of the global economy. 35 The ability to collect 
and use data does not have any natural physical restrictions. 36 Likewise, the 
enormous amount of data that exists only continues to grow.37 Thus, without 
                                                                                                          
II decision); Ruth Boardman et al., Safe Harbor Invalid: FAQs, BIRD & BIRD (Nov. 2015), https://
www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2015/global/safe-harbor-invalid-faqs [https://perma.cc/JN42-
FK9V] (suggesting that the alternatives are merely “short term” solutions). 
 31 See infra notes 35–73 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 74–111 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 112–130 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 131–154 and accompanying text. 
 35 See Daniel J. Grimm, The Dark Data Quandary, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 761, 763 (2019) (recogniz-
ing that people are generally aware of the abundance of data in their daily lives); Dennis D. Hirsch, 
The Glass House Effect: Big Data, the New Oil, and the Power of Analogy, 66 ME. L. REV. 373, 374–
75 (2014) (reiterating the worldwide impact of data with the commonly-used comparison “data is the 
new oil”); see also Kenneth Cukier & Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger, The Rise of Big Data: How It’s 
Changing the Way We Think About the World, 92 FOREIGN AFFS., May/June 2013, at 28, 28 (com-
menting on the impressive growth of data practices since 2000). 
 36 See D. Daniel Sokol & Roisin Comerford, Antitrust and Regulating Big Data, 23 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 1129, 1137 (2016) (observing that the use of a specific piece of data by one entity does not 
preclude another from using the same information). When multiple people can indulge in the same 
resource contemporaneously, it is called a “non-rivalrous good.” Non-Rivalrous Goods, CFI, https://
corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/non-rivalrous-goods/ [https://perma.
cc/4AZP-NJPH]. In contrast, the classic legal example of a rivalrous resource comes from Pierson v. 
Post. See 3 Cai. 175, 177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (questioning which hunter had the right to a fox that 
was killed during a simultaneous hunt). In Pierson, only one of the two hunters could have property 
rights in the animal because the possession of the fox by one man necessarily barred the other’s pos-
session. See id. at  179–80 (finding that only he who actually holds the fox has a right to it). 
 37 See OPENVAULT, BROADBAND INSIGHTS REPORT (OVBI): 1Q 2020, at 2 (2020), https://open
vault.com/NEW-SITE-OV3/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Openvault_Q120_DataUsage_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HNR9-BDYE] (calculating the 47% growth in data utilization between the f ir st  
fiscal quarters of 2019 and 2020); State of BI & Analytics Report, SISENSE, https://www.sisense.com/
whitepapers/state-of-bi-analytics-report-2020/ [https://perma.cc/4YR5-W327] (detailing the increased 
application of data practices in a broad range of corporate functions, such as productivity and custom-
er assistance). In 2020, the amount of data used and produced rapidly surged in tandem with the flux 
of individuals working and socializing from their devices at home. See Autumn Molay & Ryan Wil-
liams, In-Home Data Usage Increases During Coronavirus Pandemic, COMSCORE (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://www.comscore.com/Insights/Blog/In-Home-Data-Usage-Increases-During-Coronavirus-
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external regulation, the potential for its accrual is limitless, and the incentive to 
do so is large. 38 
And yet, there is no obvious or commonly accepted standard for personal 
data regulation. 39 Legislatures face the difficult challenge of balancing corpo-
rate profitability with the individual privacy concerns of their citizens. 40 Strict 
privacy regulations decrease the amount of data that a corporation can collect 
and sell. 41 Alternatively, weak privacy regulations leave peoples’ personal in-
formation at risk. 42 Thus, data regulation necessarily puts national economic 
success at odds with the rights of individuals. 43 Subsection 1 of this Section 
assesses the commercial potential for personal data on the trade market.44 In 
contrast, Subsection 2 considers the personal privacy concerns that are also 
tied to the sale of data. 45 
                                                                                                          
Pandemic [https://perma.cc/GW3J-UU47] (noting the impact that COVID-19 restrictions had on the 
incidence of data production). 
 38 See ALBERT OPHER ET AL., THE RISE OF THE DATA ECONOMY: DRIVING VALUE THROUGH 
INTERNET OF THINGS DATA MONETIZATION 2 (2016), https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/4 JR
OLDQ7 [https://perma.cc/3SY7-7GP9] (noting that data practices are becoming more straightfor -
ward); Angela Byers, Big Data, Big Economic Impact?, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 757, 
759–60 (2015) (highlighting the monetary implications of efficient data manipulation); So k ol &  
Comerford, supra note 36, at 1137 (commenting on the ability of many entities to control the same 
data at once). Efficient data application can propagate billions to trillions of dollars for the US’s cor-
porate economy. See Byers, supra, at 759–60 (cumulating studies to suggest that the American retail 
and manufacturing industries can conserve massive sums of money just by properly leveraging data). 
 39 See Data Protection Laws of the World, DLA PIPER, https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com 
[https://perma.cc/ZM4U-TJ8X] (depicting the vigorousness of privacy protection across the globe). 
Despite their differences, EU countries and the US both have strong privacy regulation when com-
pared with countries like Botswana, Kenya, and Paraguay. See id. (categorizing countries into four 
levels of privacy standards, and placing the EU nations and the US in the strongest regulatory catego-
ry). 
 40 See Hirsch, supra note 35, at 375 (acknowledging the concurrent advantages and disadvantages 
of trading personal data). 
 41 See id. (presenting privacy and profitability as a sliding scale of interests). Thus, as privacy 
rights increase, the profitability of data can decrease. See id. 
 42 See Frank Pasquale, 7 Ways Data Currently Being Collected About You Could Hurt Your Career 
or Personal Life, HUFFPOST https://www.huffpost.com/entry/data-collected-hurt-career-personal_b_
6110682 [https://perma.cc/Y8A3-3WSH] (Dec. 6, 2017) (describing a wide range of privacy misuses 
that might occur but are rarely considered by the individual). In addition to more classic and predicta-
ble misuses of data, there are some more zany examples of its abuse as well. Id. For example, data 
misrepresentation can lead to improper implications in a drug crime, or even nefarious actors collect-
ing disposed coffee cups to gather genetic information from its long-gone drinker. Id. 
 43 See Hirsch, supra note 35, at 375 (linking the quantity of data to its potential danger). 
 44 See infra notes 46–59 and accompanying text. 
 45 See infra notes 60–73 and accompanying text. 
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1. Economic Incentives Favor the Broad Sale of Data 
Data is incredibly lucrative and can holistically increase the wealth of its 
constituents. 46 Throughout history, merchants have used the personal prefer-
ences of their customers to drive their economic success in the market.47 To-
day, modern businesses can even manipulate individualized data to better de-
velop, peddle, and sell goods, all while evading the costs of generalized mass 
marketing. 48 As consumer information has become digitally discernable and 
more easily acquired, the associated riches have likewise grown. 49 Therefore, 
many companies have focused an increasing amount of their resources on pro-
cessing more data and leveraging it for profit. 50 Both large and small business-
es have begun to accrue massive amounts of revenue from doing so in recent 
years. 51 Personal data currently approaches a multi-trillion dollar industry.52 
                                                                                                          
 46 See Byers, supra note 38, at 761 (explaining that data can benefit individuals, even in obscure 
ways like decreasing the time and cost associated with travel); Mat Travizano, The Tech Giants Get 
Rich Using Your Data. What Do You Get in Return?, ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.
entrepreneur.com/article/319952 [https://perma.cc/658T-JSL9] (claiming that Google alone can earn 
over $3 billion from data each quarter). Information that can be leveraged for profit can come from 
many sources, including geographic location, energy production, car sensors, pulse trackers, and spa-
tial comparisons. See OPHER ET AL., supra note 38, at 6–7 (giving examples of different areas of data 
that a business might utilize to make money). 
 47 See Big Data Analytics: What It Is and Why It Matters, SAS, https://www.sas.com/en_ us/
insights/analytics/big-data-analytics.html [https://perma.cc/P47K-J5K3] (claiming that retailers used 
data as a marketing tool in the 1950s). Over half a century ago, before data was a digital concept,  
vendors analyzed personal data to stay in tune with their consumers’ preferences. See id. (explaining 
that retailers compile data in ledgers and manipulate it  to keep in vogue). 
 48 See ALESSANDRO ACQUISTI, THE ECONOMICS OF PERSONAL DATA AND THE ECONOMICS OF 
PRIVACY 8 (2010), https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/46968784.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQQ7-W53P] 
(noting that a business can scrutinize a collection of personal data to forecast the future of its industry 
and meet the desires of its consumers). In 2009, the sale of goods using web-based marketing ac-
counted for a $300 billion revenue in the US alone. Id. From analyzing the data that they collect, re-
tailers can learn how to target their advertisements to those most likely to purchase the item and de-
termine which products or improvements the market desires most. See id. at 8–9 (explaining several 
ways that a business can use the data to alter its behavior). It can, thus, reduce the overhead costs that 
might elsewise counteract its profit. See id. (concluding that these changes are economically prudent). 
 49 See Big Data Analytics, supra note 47 (claiming that businesses can find success from the new-
found momentum of personal data collection). Two ways that a company can discern valuable infor-
mation from data are through prognostic analyses and self-teaching artificial intelligence. See id. (de-
fining the practices of “predictive analytics” and “machine learning”). Both practices use information-
al input to develop more suitable output for future transactions. Id. 
 50 See Byers, supra note 38, at 757 (flagging data as a primary concern for many businesses,  
especially those in the tech space); Sokol & Comerford, supra note 36, at 1129 (recognizing that busi-
nesses gather significantly more data via the internet than ever before). 
 51 See Joseph Kennedy, Big Data’s Economic Impact, COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., https://www.ced.
org/blog/entry/big-datas-economic-impact [https://perma.cc/S97A-495J] (citing that US data utiliza-
tion could earn upwards of $1.3 trillion just from seven fields of business). Businesses that use data to 
guide their practices work better and faster than their non-data using counterparts.  S ee Andrew 
McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson, Big Data: The Management Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 1 ,  
2012), https://hbr.org/2012/10/big-data-the-management-revolution [https://perma.cc/JW8H-URDM] 
(concluding that decisions based in collected information were at least 5% more effective). 
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Although its global trade is already incredibly lucrative, the market for  
data sales expects nearly to double in the upcoming years. 53 National borders 
do not limit the sale of data. 54 Thus, a country’s ability to exchange data extra-
territorially can have a significant impact on the profitability of its corporate 
economy. 55 
In addition to the corporate advantage, individuals can also reap the eco-
nomic benefits of personal data analysis. 56 Customers may benefit from seeing 
only ads that they might want or need, paying lower costs for the services they 
use, and having better products at their disposal sooner. 57 Additionally, several 
companies have adopted models that allow customers to participate actively 
and make money off of the collection of their own data. 58 The personal data 
trade, nevertheless, is not limitlessly beneficial. 59 
2. Individual Privacy Incentives Favor the Restricted Sale of Data 
Although personal information is valuable, it can come at a cost to the in-
dividual. 60 Data collectors often amass more data than they are capable of put-
                                                                                                          
 52 Kennedy, supra note 51. 
 53 See Big Data Market—Global Forecast to 2025, MARKETSANDMARKETS (Mar. 2020), https://
www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/big-data-market-1068.html [https://perma.cc/9R9F-
39FN] (projecting the expected increase in data revenue between 2020 and 2025). Global data ex-
change revenues will likely increase from $138.9 billion in 2020 to $229.4 billion by 2025, reflecting 
an increase in profitability of over 65%. Id. 
 54 See RACHEL F. FEFER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45584, DATA FLOWS, ONLINE PRIVACY, AND 
T RADE POLICY 1 (2019) (reflecting on international trade practices for personal data); Brad McDon-
ald, Why Countries Trade, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2009, at 48, 48 (commenting that countries will decide 
to trade with each other for the sake of making money and allowing their economies to remain com-
petitive). 
 55 See Hirsch, supra note 35, at 374 (likening data to an asset that can correlate heavily with suc-
cess in the market). 
 56 See Sokol & Comerford, supra note 36, at 1133–35 (listing ways that individuals may benefit 
from their own data collection, including the cheapness, caliber, and novelty of the goods that they 
receive in return). Once data collectors collect and analyze the users’ data, they then apply it to tailor 
their goods or services to the individual consumer. See id. at 1134 (explaining how data use can recip-
rocally help the customers). 
 57 See id. at  1133 (claiming why highly-tailored data is better). 
 58 See ACQUISTI, supra note 48, at 10 (noting that some businesses will reward customers that 
disclose their information); see, e.g., Earn Rewards, GOOGLE OP. REWARDS HELP, https://support.
google.com/opinionrewards/answer/7378183?hl=en#zippy= [https://perma.cc/SP3U-R3TH] (describ-
ing their survey-based rewards system). For example, Google Opinion Rewards provides users with 
data analyst-operated questionnaires. Earn Rewards, supra. In turn, the program pays users a nominal 
value for their responses. See id. (claiming that a user can earn up to a dollar for each survey). 
 59 See Hirsch, supra note 35, at 378 (continuing the comparison between data and oil to suggest 
that data is likewise prone to messy complications). 
 60 See ACQUISTI, supra note 48, at 3 (suggesting that over-intrusive data collection can produce a 
highly accurate record of an individual’s life-story that, in turn, creates significant risk). 
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ting to use. 61 The more information that a corporation collects or trades on a 
person, the closer the digital fingerprint parallels the individual’s actual life 
experience. 62 In turn, that person becomes increasingly identifiable and subject 
to inherent risk. 63 Moreover, today’s data practices involve far more than just 
consumer preferences.64 The average data collector or processor can generate 
information relating to an individual’s geographic location, spending habits,  
and physical descriptors.65 
Yet colossal data breaches and nefarious use are common, and the broad 
collection and trade of data can have serious implications for people’s securi-
ty. 66 Breaches reveal private information to unintended recipients. 67 That in-
formation may be used to harm the individual in most, if not all, aspec ts  of  
life. 68 Most often, ill-intentioned recipients will use the misappropriated data to 
                                                                                                          
 61 See Grimm, supra note 35, at 768 (contending that the vast majority of data that collectors 
gather then goes unused). Unused and unprocessed data is called “dark data.” Id. By one estimate, 
over 90% of all data that exists is dark data. Id. at 768–69. In addition to being wasteful, dark data 
implicates legal concerns because businesses cannot regulate the quality and safety of personal data 
that they do not know needs protection. Id. at 780. 
 62 See ACQUISTI, supra note 48, at 3 (likening a person’s data profile to a “dossier”). 
 63 See, e.g., Khaled El Emam et al., Evaluating the Risk of Re-identification of Patients from Hos-
pital Prescription Records, 62 CANADIAN J. HOSP. PHARMACY 307, 307–08, 313–15 (2009) (testing 
the possibility to pinpoint an individual from their medication-related data and concluding that the 
probability of identification was high and put the individual’s privacy at significant risk). 
 64 See OPHER ET AL., supra note 38, at 6–7 (showing the range of data that a business might wish 
to collect about a person). 
 65 Id. at  5–7 (giving examples of ways that a business might collect information and the types of 
information they may look for). 
 66 See Hirsch, supra note 35, at 378 (predicting that the amount of personal data violations is even 
higher than the thousands reported); RISK BASED SEC., 2021 MID YEAR REPORT: DATA BRE ACH 
QUICKVIEW 2 (2021), https://pages.riskbasedsecurity.com/hubfs/Reports/2021/2021%20Mid%20Year
%20Data%20Breach%20QuickView%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW5S-3BVJ] (stating that the US 
had at least 1,767 breaches in the first half of 2021); Brooke Auxier et al., Americans and Privacy: Con-
cerned, Confused and Feeling a Lack of Control Over Their Personal Information, PEW RSCH. CTR.  
(Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-
confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/ [https://perma.cc/UD72-8FU5] 
(detailing that most Americans are deeply worried about the ways that the government and companies 
use their data to gain information about them). In one of the more significant data breaches, hackers 
accessed the information of approximately one hundred million Target Corp. customers in December 
2013. Hirsch, supra note 35, at 378. 
 67 How Data Breaches Happen, KASPERSKY, https://usa.kaspersky.com/resource-center/definitions/
data-breach [https://perma.cc/5757-PA3S]. Breaches are not necessarily malicious. See id. (explaining 
that data breaches can be both purposeful and accidental). And they can occur several different ways. 
See id. (commenting that sometimes data hackers will trick users into sending them private data, while 
others force their way into sensitive databases). Breaches that do involve malintent are often called 
“hacks” and the bad actors called “hackers.” See Jenny Knafo, Data Breach vs. Data Hack, DEVOLU-
TIONS (May 23, 2019), https://blog.devolutions.net/2019/05/data-breach-vs-data-hack [https://perma.
cc/X9XW-XCQG] (differentiating a “breach” from a “hack” by the underlying objective). 
 68 How Data Breaches Happen, supra note 67 (claiming that personal data may be leveraged to 
cause political, financial, and social injury). Unfortunately, people do not always realize that their 
information has been compromised for a significant amount of time. See Rob Sobers, Data Breach 
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make valuable transactions at the individual’s expense. 69 But some use it for 
other purposes, like blackmail. 70 In just the last decade, breaches at popular US 
businesses have compromised billions of peoples’ information. 71 Although a 
large number of breaches have occurred in corporate settings, personal data is 
always vulnerable and becomes a target regardless of where it gets stored.72 
Thus, privacy risks serve as an inherent caveat to unlimited data collection.73 
                                                                                                          
Response Times: Trends and Tips, VARONIS, https://blogvaronis2.wpengine.com/data-breach-response-
times/ [https://perma.cc/FN8Z-GE36] (June 17, 2020) (lamenting that companies take nearly seven 
months to recognize that a breach has happened). 
 69 See What Happens to Your Personal Information Once You’ve Been Hacked?, SELFKEY (Nov. 
21, 2019), https://selfkey.org/what-happens-to-your-personal-information-once-youve-been-hacked/ 
[https:/perma.cc/2U98-NCRF] (claiming that financial data is among the most lucrative types of data). 
Hackers can steal financial data to make purchases on the bank accounts of another individual. Id. 
They can also use medical data to obtain care on another’s insurance. Id. Alternatively, a hacker could 
steal another’s intellectual property to avoid incurring development or licensing fees. Id. 
 70 Id. Some hackers will use personal data to force individuals into choices that they would oth-
erwise not make. See, e.g., id. (providing one example where a news reporter used stolen data about 
the CEO of Amazon.com, Inc., Jeff Bezos, and his adultery for blackmail). 
 71 See Michael Hill & Dan Swinhoe, The 15 Biggest Data Breaches of the 21st Century, CSO 
(July 16, 2021), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-
century.html [https://perma.cc/A2XG-MDNR] (highlighting some of the largest breaches in history, 
including Yahoo! Inc. (Yahoo) in 2013 and 2014, LinkedIn Corp. in 2012 and 2021, and Facebook in 
2019). The breach at Yahoo in 2013 exemplifies how complicated they can be. See id. (explaining that 
the breach eventually resulted in a reduced acquisition price of the business years later). Yahoo failed 
to disclose the breach for three years, and even then, underreported the affected users by two billion. 
See id. (noting that the original claim to one billion affected persons in 2016 was increased to three 
billion by 2017). Despite the frequency and severity of large breaches, the US judicial system does not 
always provide an accessible remedy to the victims of a hack. See generally Nicolas N. LaBranche, 
Note, The Economic Loss Doctrine & Data Breach Litigation: Applying the “Venerable Chestnut of 
Tort Law” in the Age of the Internet, 62 B.C. L. REV. 1665, 1665–88 (2021) (proposing that many 
data breach victims are unable to seek redress in court because they cannot surpass “procedural hur-
dles”). 
 72 See Dmitry Dontov, What Businesses Are the Most Vulnerable to Cyberattacks?, FORBES (Jan. 
19, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2021/01/19/what-businesses-are-the-most-vulnerable-
to-cyberattacks/?sh=2a313e3d3534 [https://perma.cc/72SB-SXNQ] (explaining that businesses small 
and large alike may become targets to data breaches); see, e.g., RISK BASED SEC., supra n ote  6 6 
(commenting on an unexpected and seemingly random breach in 2021 at Ducks.org). Data breach  
analysts were surprised by the May 2021 breach of Ducks.org because the business was a nonprofit 
and solely works to protect duck species. See RISK BASED SEC., supra note 66 (acknowledging that 
large, popular, and profitable entities are the normal targets to a data attack). Although Ducks.org has 
a more obscure and smaller database, the breach revealed the private data of 474,000 people. Id. 
 73 See DELOITTE, Managing Data Risks for Value Creation, in FUTURE OF RISK IN THE DIGITAL 
ERA 14, 14–15 (2019), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/finance/us-rfa-
future-of-risk-in-the-digital-era-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6G5-VLJB] (juxtaposing the monetary 
advantages to data trade with the danger it  causes to suggest ways that a business may balance the 
two). 
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B. The EU Versus US Data Privacy Frameworks: A Conflict  
Between Omnibus and Sectoral Legislation 
Despite having similar stances on privacy as a fundamental human right, 
the centralization of the EU’s privacy legislation is structurally antithetical to 
the patchwork system developed in the US. 74 Subsection 1 of this Section de-
tails the broad personal data protections afforded by centralized privacy law in 
the EU. 75 In contrast, Subsection 2 describes the specific protections afforded 
by sectoral laws in the US and the subsequent incompatibility with EU privacy 
law demands. 76 
1. The EU Takes an “Omnibus” Approach to Privacy Legislation 
For decades, the EU strived to expand upon very few data protection laws 
that could simultaneously encompass the wide range of privacy concerns.77 To 
accomplish this goal, the EU developed “omnibus” laws. 78 This type of um-
brella legislation purports to protect all European constituents from the wide 
range of personal data abuses that they may encounter. 79 The laws have con-
tinued to liberally define both the subjects and scope of their protection.80 
                                                                                                          
 74 See Gabe Maldoff & Omer Tene, “Essential Equivalence” and European Adequacy A fter 
Schrems: The Canadian Example, 34 WIS. INT’L L.J. 211, 221 (2016) (contrasting the many compo-
nents of US privacy law with the localized “omnibus” law in the EU). Like the EU, Canada opted to 
develop umbrella data privacy legislation. Id. at 218–20. This law, the Personal Information Protec-
tion and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), broadened the protections of Canadians’ perso nal 
information that the government and private entities collect. Id. at 218–19. 
 75 See infra notes 77–95 and accompanying text. 
 76 See infra notes 96–111 and accompanying text. 
 77 See Ben Wolford, What Is GDPR, the EU’s New Data Protection Law?, GDPR.EU, https://
gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/8ZD9-HM63] (giving a history of the legislation and practices 
leading up to the EU’s adoption of the GDPR); Data Protection in the EU, EUR. COMM’N, https://
ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-protection-eu_en [https://perma.cc/E2AU-Z97W] 
(overviewing the omnibus privacy structure that the EU developed through two pieces of legislation 
and a few oversight authorities). 
 78 See Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1973–74 (2013) (stating that the Data Protection Directive (DPD), which 
emphasized the need to maintain open channels for safe data trading, perpetuated the development of 
an omnibus regime in the EU). An “omnibus” law covers data coming from any type of commerce. 
Voss, supra note 29, at 421. Although omnibus privacy frameworks do not preclude the state from 
having additional sectoral regulations, those additions are subordinate law. See Schwartz, supra, at  
1974 (claiming that a nation may include supplementary legislation that can provide additional regula-
tions for individual areas that may require more protection). 
 79 See Schwartz, supra note 78, at 1975 (noting that omnibus legislation protects data, irrespective 
of the collector or the type of information that the data holds). 
 80 See, e.g., Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 10, art. 4(1), at 33 (defining “personal data” to 
include any information that could relate to or pinpoint an individual). 
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The broad privacy rights of European citizens have expanded and solidi-
fied over time. 81 Since 1950, the EU has sought to spearhead the global 
movement toward strong and all-encompassing legislation to protect the right 
to privacy. 82 In 1995, the EU passed its first directive aimed to safeguard its  
constituents from the threat that new advances in technology posed to priva-
cy. 83 Two decades later, it enacted the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), what many consider to be the world’s strongest and most ancillary 
privacy legislation. 84 This document has proven to be a formidable and fortify-
ing culmination of many rights regarded as necessary to protect the personal 
data of Europeans. 85 
                                                                                                          
 81 See MILDEBRATH, supra note 12 (noting that the Schrems II Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) decision was a continuation of its trajectory towards stronger data privacy protections). 
The CJEU has played a significant role in securing and enhancing privacy rights for Europeans. Id. 
For example, in 2006, it voided an unrelated privacy agreement that regulated the transfer of travel-
related data. Id. See generally Commission Decision 2004/535, of 14 May 2004 on the Adequat e  
Protection of Personal Data Contained in the Passenger Name Record of Air Passengers Transferred 
to the United States’ Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 2004 O.J. (L 235) 11 (EC) (allowing 
for passenger data collected at the border to be transferred between the EU and US). The court also 
protested the enactment of an equivalent agreement with Canada in 2017. MILDEBRATH, supra note 
12. See generally SHARA MONTELEONE, EUR. PARL. RSCH. SERV., PE 608.673, CJEU OPINION ON 
EU-CANADA PNR AGREEMENT (2017), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/
2017/608673/EPRS_ATA(2017)608673_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2ZT-XM9X] (providing an over-
view of the Canadian version of the Passenger Name Record Agreement that the CJEU likewise re-
jected). 
 82 Wolford, supra note 77. See generally Complete Guide to GDPR Compliance, GDPR.E U,  
https://gdpr.eu [https://perma.cc/Z6KS-T5TV] (offering a wide range of resources to better understand 
the development and implementation of the GDPR). 
 83 See generally Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Octo-
ber 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (providing standards to safeguard the collection 
of personal data), repealed by Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 10; Voss, supra note 29, at 420 
(offering a brief introduction to Directive 95/46/EC). 
 84 Wolford, supra note 77. The GDPR replaced the DPD. Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 
10, art . 94, at 86. The six major updates from the DPD to the GDPR were: (1) expanding the defini-
tion of “personal data” to encompass more of a comprehensive profile of information; (2) empowering 
individuals with control over their information; (3) regulating “processors” in addition to “control-
lers”; (4) demanding that data security be fundamental to businesses organization; (5) standardizing 
the disclosure of and punishment for violations; and (6) adding provisions for extraterritorial regula-
tion by the EU. See The Main Differences Between the DPD and the GDPR and How to Add ress 
Those Moving Forward, SEEUNITY, https://britishlegalitforum.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/
GDPR-Whitepaper-British-Legal-Technology-Forum-2017-Sponsor.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZMN-
D4AV] (comparing the 1995 DPD with the 2016 GDPR). 
 85 See Wolford, supra note 77 (recognizing the extreme toughness of the GDPR and its require-
ments). The monetary penalties associated with the GDPR’s enforcement have been massive. See Ben 
Swagerman, The Biggest GDPR Fines to Date, LEXOLOGY (June 15, 2020), https://www.lexology.
com/library/detail.aspx?g=ac77a2a3-b19c-4c7d-8031-4021e5fc90f4 [https://perma.cc/4KLD-7SYD] 
(giving examples of GDPR-related fines). Google L.L.C. accrued a $57 million fine from France 
based on one violation alone. Id. Amazon.com, Inc. was recently hit with the largest GDPR penalty of 
all t ime, totaling in at a massive $888 million. Stephanie Bodoni, Amazon Gets Record $888 Million 
EU Fine Over Data Violations, Bloomberg (July 30, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/n ews/
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One data privacy privilege that the EU gave to its residents and citizens, 
called “extraterritoriality,” allows them to bootstrap their rights to wherever 
they or their data go in the world. 86 Thus, privacy legislation enacted in the EU 
can nonetheless have legal implications for organizations seeming to act exclu-
sively outside of the EU. 87 Although data trade limitations may negatively im-
pact its economy, the EU chose to actively prioritize the safekeeping of per-
sonal data by restricting the flow of identifiable information to parties which 
can safeguard it competently. 88 
The EU has required, by law, that all foreign recipients of European data 
must be “adequate[ly]” prepared to receive and protect it. 89 An entity may be 
“adequate” if either (1) its home country receives nationwide approval or (2) it 
receives approval of its own privacy measures.90 The EU determines a coun-
try’s aptitude to protect personal data at the European Commission (the Com-
mission) by scrutinizing the ability of the local regulations to protect funda-
mental privacy rights. 91 Foreign countries have the burden to show the Com-
                                                                                                          
articles/2021-07-30/amazon-given-record-888-million-eu-fine-for-data-privacy-breach [https://perma.
cc/5HDS-ZMUS]. 
 86 See Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 10, art. 3(1), at 32 (“This Regulation applies . . . 
whether the processing takes place in the Union or not.”). 
 87 See id. (providing for the law’s extraterritorial scope). For example, a company that believes 
itself to be fully situated in the US, and only intends to process the data of US citizens, might unknow-
ingly become subject to the provisions of the GDPR. See id. (showing that a European could migrate 
into the US with his or her data privacy rights, possibly making this hypothetical corporation, despite 
its intentions, a processor of that European’s data). 
 88 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 7, 8, 47, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 
391, 397, 405 (providing redress for any violations to an individual’s right to private life and infor-
mation); Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 83, art. 1, at 22–24 (emphasizing that the EU would take 
active steps to guarantee the personal liberties and privacy rights of individuals). The Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the EU provides Europeans with rights to: (1) self-respect; (2) personal liberties; 
(3) fairness; (4) safe social and professional conditions; (5) individual rights; and (6) legal protection. 
See generally Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra (providing Europeans 
with a plethora of rights in all walks of life). 
 89 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 83, arts. 25–26, at 45–46. 
 90 See Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 10, recital 108, at 20 (explaining that without  a  
national approval, businesses must take additional steps to ensure the legality of their data-related 
business with the EU). Although individual approval is possible through mechanisms like SCCs and 
BCRs, it  is far more complicated than a nationwide transatlantic agreement would be. See Claude-
Étienne Armingaud et al., EU Data Protection: Standard Contractual Clauses May Have Been Con-
firmed by the CJEU, but at What Price?, K&L GATES (July 17, 2020), https://www.klgates.com/eu-
data-protection-standard-contractual-clauses-may-have-been-confirmed-by-the-cjeu-but-at-what-
price-07-17-2020 [https://perma.cc/8X8Z-PSAX] (noting that SCCs may be difficult to apply because 
they depend on the state’s additional safeguards to be valid); Natalie Whitney, GDPR: Standard Con-
tractual Clauses vs Binding Corporate Rules, GRCI L., https://www.grcilaw.com/blog/international-
data-transfers-model-contract-clauses-vs-binding-corporate-rules [https://perma.cc/8V3Y-R7NP] (Apr. 
8, 2021) (explaining that BCRs are less applicable than other mechanisms because they are only rele-
vant for larger entities). 
 91 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 88, art. 8(1), at 397; Di-
rective 95/46/EC, supra note 83, arts. 25–26, at 45–46. The European Commission (the Commission) 
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mission their own suitability to receive data from the EU. 92 The Commission 
may decide based on its consideration of the requesting country’s ability to 
protect the personal information of European citizens. 93 When the Commission 
finds that a country has sufficient data security in place, it publishes  its  ap-
proval through an “adequacy decision.”94 If a country does not have such a 
decision, individual entities may only transfer data if they implement their own 
protection measures to comply with EU standards. 95 
2. Meanwhile, the US Takes a “Sectoral” Approach to Privacy Legislation 
Unlike the EU, the US privacy framework consists of a hodgepodge of 
state and federal laws that regulate individual categories of privacy protec -
tion. 96 Due to this divided structure, the US has “sectoral” privacy legisla-
tion. 97 This approach allows the US to develop highly-tailored laws that focus 
specifically on the privacy concerns that come from a specific sector of busi-
ness. 98 Each piece of legislation has the flexibility to define whom it will regu-
                                                                                                          
is an administrative directorate with the authority to decide whether a country has “adequate . . . data 
protection” to receive data from the EU. Adequacy Decisions, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/
info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-protection/adequacy-decisions_en 
[https://perma.cc/3EDL-KMXH]. Although Directive 95/46/EC does not expressly define “adequate,” 
the CJEU ruled that its language demands that the country: (1) have regulations that will guarantee the 
data is sufficiently safeguarded; and (2) have those safeguards be evaluated to make certain they “pro-
tect[] . . . the private lives and basic freedoms and rights” of Europeans. Case C–362/14, Schrems v. 
Data Prot. Comm’r (Schrems I), ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶¶ 70–72 (Oct. 6, 2015) (quoting Directive 
95/46/EC, supra note 83, art. 25(6), at 46) (confirming that adequacy may be evaluated with consider-
ation to many factors and invoking the requirements of Article 8(1)). 
 92 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 83, recital 57, at 37, art. 25(6), at 46. Non-member countries 
must provide legally binding evidence to show the EU, via the Commission, that it deserves to contin-
ue their international trade. Id. art. 25(6), at 46. 
 93 See id. recital 56, at 36 (“[T]he adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country 
must be assessed in the light of all the circumstances surrounding the transfer . . . .”). 
 94 Id. art . 25(6), at 46; see WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 6, at 12 (discussing the necessity for the 
CJEU to approve of data-transfer mechanisms). 
 95 See Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 10, recital 108, at 20 (recognizing that an individual 
business can use SCCs and/or BCRs to exchange data with the EU if their nation does not have the 
required privacy standards). 
 96 See Maldoff & Tene, supra note 74, at 221 (describing the culmination of all US privacy laws 
to be like an ill-constructed “quilt,” rather than a singular cohesive piece of legislation). Some of the 
sectors that US privacy law regulates concern information relating to health, finances, education, and 
electronic communication. Id. 
 97 Voss, supra note 29, at 418. 
 98 STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN & CHRIS D. LINEBAUGH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45631, DATA PRO-
TECTION LAW: AN OVERVIEW 7–39 (2019) (demonstrating the ability of a sectoral approach to have 
very specific laws that can explicitly regulate the exact abuses it  wishes to protect Americans from); 
see Schwartz, supra note 78, at 1974 (providing Professor David Flaherty’s claim that sectoral laws 
react to distinct issues with strong and customized protection). There is no individual agency tasked 
with overseeing the enforcement of federal privacy regulations. Maldoff & Tene, supra note 74, at 
222. Instead, different agencies are responsible for overseeing different sectoral laws. See id. (listing 
multiple federal agencies that collectively substitute for having a localized “regulator”). For example, 
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late and what data it will embrace. 99 New data privacy laws in a given sector 
can, and often do, define their protections differently from those dealing in 
another sector. 100 Collectively, these laws regulate personal data use by all pub-
lic and private entities that are within the realm of a specific law. 101 Certain 
data or businesses, however, may potentially go unregulated if no sectoral law 
covers them. 102 
In addition, individual states have also developed vastly differing and 
conflicting standards of protection. 103 These laws are supplementary to federal 
data privacy regulations. 104 Therefore, states may differ on the breadth of the 
                                                                                                          
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is tasked with the enforcement of the CAN-SPAM Act, a priva-
cy law that regulates certain electronic communications. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited 
Pornography and Marketing (CAN-SPAM) Act of 2003 §§ 6–7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7704–7705. On the 
other hand, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) acts as the regulator for HIPAA, which sets standards 
for medical data. Off. of Civ. Rts. (OCR), Enforcement Highlights, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/data/enforcement-
highlights/index.html [https://perma.cc/JNS8-9GAL] (Aug. 11, 2021). See generally Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191 110 Stat. 1936 (detailing 
the provisions of the Act). 
 99 MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 98, at 7–8. 
 100 See Voss, supra note 29, at 410 (describing the lack of continuity between data privacy legis-
lation within the US). 
 101 Maldoff & Tene, supra note 74, at 221. The Privacy Act of 1974 regulates the standards that 
all federal agencies must meet in their interaction with personal data. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. This legislation 
purported to “balance” federal agencies’ demand for personal data with an individual’s fundamental 
right not to have their privacy unnecessarily violated. Overview of the Privacy Act of 1 97 4,  U.S.  
DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/opcl/policy-objectives [https://perma.cc/GKC6-TMMB] 
(Feb. 24, 2021). Congress enacted the law in response to the infamous “Watergate scandal,” whereby 
a federal agency used wiretapping technology to illicitly spy on the political opponents of sitting Pres-
ident Richard Nixon. Id.; see Watergate Scandal, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/1970s/water
gate [https://perma.cc/6HPG-TR54] (June 16, 2021) (chronicling the actions taken by the Committee 
to Re-Elect the President in the office of the Democratic National Committee on June 17, 1972). Sus-
picion surrounding President Nixon’s personal involvement led to his eventual resignation. See Wa-
tergate Scandal, supra (detailing the President’s departure from office in 1974). 
 102 See Maldoff & Tene, supra note 74, at 221 (noting the gap in US privacy law that may exist 
for an organization that is not specifically regulated). Unlike in omnibus legislation, there is no catch-
all engrained into the US data privacy structure. Id.; see Voss, supra note 29, at 421 (defining an  
“omnibus” law by its broad reach). Although it  has continued to carve out distinct areas of concern, 
there is an inherent possibility for abuse of personal data to slip through the cracks. See Maldoff & 
Tene, supra note 74, at 221 (explaining that an organization may “fall outside of” federal protection). 
 103 Voss, supra note 29, at 410. 
 104 See Maldoff & Tene, supra note 74, at 221 (discussing the US’s multi-level sector-based web 
of privacy legislation); Lesley Daunt, State vs. Federal Law: Who Really Holds the Trump Card?, 
HUFFPOST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/state-vs-federal-law-who-_b_4676579 [https://perma.cc/
3XMD-V4AW] (Mar. 30, 2014) (noting that state regulations can add to but not contradict federal 
legislation). As provided by its Constitution, the US has a two-tiered government, with legislativ e 
powers at both the federal and state levels. CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30315, FEDERALISM, STATE SOV-
EREIGNTY, AND THE CONSTITUTION: BASIS AND LIMITS OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER 1 (2013). The 
interrelation between these tiers is called “federalism.” Id. States have certain power, called “sover-
eignty,” to regulate themselves individually. Id. But there are restrictions to that power as well. See id. 
(commenting that states do not have certain self-regulatory powers, including the power to wage war). 
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additional protections that they afford to their constituents.105 Similar to the 
approach of federal data privacy, some states have introduced more category-
specific laws. 106 Conversely, other states have recently opted to develop more 
generalized pseudo-omnibus legislation. 107 Although states have the autonomy 
to expand their privacy protections, the laws of one state have the ability to 
affect an entity conducting business in another state because technology and 
data permeate state borders. 108 
Because the US takes a sectoral approach and has varying standards, the 
EU has never deemed the US “adequate” to receive personal data from the 
EU. 109 Instead, the Department of Commerce has twice negotiated a mecha-
nism to allow certified and compliant American entities to trade data between 
the EU and US lawfully. 110 The agreements borne from those negotiations pur-
                                                                                                          
Many of the powers not held by state governments are held by the federal government instead. See, 
e.g., id. at  2 (noting that the power to “coin money” is that of the federal government alone). State 
governments must also defer to and obey any laws promulgated by the federal tier. U.S. CONST. art. 
VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land . . . .”). 
 105 See 2020 Consumer Data Privacy Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATU RES,  
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/2020-consumer-data-
privacy-legislation637290470.aspx [https://perma.cc/SZ83-TSSN] (Jan. 17, 2021) (providing updates 
on various types of privacy legislation that each state added or failed to add to their state  laws in  
2020). 
 106 See, e.g., Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) of 2018, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 
(2020) (protecting Illinois residents from the collection and use of data derived from their bo dily  
measurements). Illinois provides additional regulation for data relating to a “biometric identifier.” Id. 
This information can include a broad range of details, such as fingerprints, voice data, or facial struc-
ture. Id. at 14/10. 
 107 See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–
.194 (Supp. 2021) (providing Californians with a wide range of protections to safeguard their personal 
data). See generally Carol A. F. Umhoefer, CCPA vs. GDPR: The Same, Only Different, DLA PIPER 
(Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2019/04/ipt-news-q1-2019/
ccpa-vs-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/C64Q-YFFG] (reflecting on the common comparison between the 
Californian law and EU omnibus law). The CCPA gives Californians a broad set of controls over their 
personal data. See CIV. §§ 1798.100–.120. Its provisions include many data rights, such as the “right 
to know,” “right to delete,” “right to opt out,” and right to non-discrimination. Id. §§ 1798.105, .115, 
.120, .125. Although this is not necessarily true omnibus legislation, it does share many similarities to 
laws like the GDPR, and it is not necessarily sector specific. See generally id. § 1798.100–.120 (hav-
ing similar provisions to the EU GDPR’s rights to know, restrict, and prevent further data collection); 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 10 (providing the EU’s omnibus law). 
 108 See CIV. § 1798.145(a)(6) (providing the possibility for the CCPA to have extraterritoria l 
reach into the jurisdiction of other US states). Only a business that has no commercial relatio n o r  
business in California or with Californians is absolutely excluded from the CCPA. Id. 
 109 See Maldoff & Tene, supra note 74, at 223 (suggesting that the US has never even attempted 
to satisfy “adequacy” pursuant to its national privacy structure because it does not have an “omnibus” 
law). 
 110 Anupam Chander, Is Data Localization a Solution for Schrems II?, 23 J. INT’L ECON. L. 771, 
772–73 (2020); see Privacy Shield Overview, PRIV. SHIELD FRAMEWORK, https://www.privacyshield.
gov/Program-Overview [https://perma.cc/5KBA-9XHU] (explaining the role of the Department of 
Commerce in finding a middle ground for data transfers to continue). The ability to make a  legal 
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ported to balance the demand for legal transatlantic data transfers with the ob-
ligation to protect the more-stringent privacy rights of EU citizens. 111 
C. Schrems I Invalidated the Data Transfer Mechanism  
Formerly Known as Safe Harbor 
The first personal data transfer mechanism that the EU and US negotiated 
was called “Safe Harbor.”112 It became effective in 2000 upon receiving its  
adequacy assessment from the Commission. 113 Under this agreement, the EU 
presumed that all entities participating in the Safe Harbor Program had “ade-
quate” protections for lawful receipt and use of EU data. 114 In turn, participants 
in Safe Harbor were bound to uphold privacy standards that guaranteed that 
the rights of EU constituents be met. 115 Organizations could apply and join the 
program by “self-certify[ing]” their commitment to follow the requirements of 
Safe Harbor. 116 Specifically, the Safe Harbor agreement required member or-
ganizations to observe seven ‘best practices’ to protect personal data. 117 
                                                                                                          
transfer of data between the EU and US can be important to organizations in both places. See Privacy 
Shield Overview, supra (noting that these agreements affect compliance “on both sides”). Although a 
US company may suffer from its inability to make use of valuable EU data, European entities are like-
wise unable to sell it , and therefore, cannot profit from such a sale. See Dan Cooper et al., Life A fter 
Schrems II: Practical Recommendations in an Uncertain Time, COVINGTON (Sept. 4, 2020), https://
www.insideprivacy.com/cross-border-transfers/life-after-schrems-ii-practical-recommendations-in-an-
uncertain-time/ [https://perma.cc/U2L4-CF45] (recognizing the reciprocal economic impact faced by 
European companies trying to make the international trade); Liem et al., supra note 14 (explaining the 
importance of data trade in the global economy). 
 111 See MILDEBRATH, supra note 12 (commenting on the compromise made to develop Privacy 
Shield); U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV, https://2016.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_
main_018476.asp [https://perma.cc/P7K7-SB3F] (Dec. 18, 2013) (reflecting a similar process to de-
velop Safe Harbor). 
 112 U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 111. 
 113 Commission Decision 2000/520, of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection provided by the Safe Harbour 
Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the US Department of Com-
merce, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7, 8 (EC). The US Department of Commerce arranged the Safe Har-
bor agreement during the Clinton Administration. Chander, supra note 110, at 773. 
 114 U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 111. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. The Safe Harbor Program required a participating organization to renew its self-assessment 
each year. Id. 
 117 See Safe Harbor Privacy Principles Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce on July 21, 
2000, EXPORT.GOV, https://2016.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018475.asp [https://perma.cc/
3RP7-VL4Q] (Jan. 30, 2009) (presenting the use of several data protection principles to overcome EU 
requirements). The US Department of Commerce published these principles to ease some confusion 
that its constituents might have regarding what the Safe Harbor agreement actually required of them. 
See id. (providing context to the document). (1) Data collectors were obligated to tell individuals why 
the business collected the personal data. See id. (explaining the Safe Harbor Principle: “Notice”). (2) 
They were also required to allow individuals to decide whether their collected personal data could 
later be transferred or used for other reasons. See id. (explaining the Safe Harbor Principle: “Choice”). 
(3) Likewise, they had to provide the preceding opportunities to individuals again if the business ever 
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Over a decade after the agreement went into effect, Maximillian Schrems 
brought a complaint that would decimate Safe Harbor. 118 Schrems claimed that 
US privacy practices allowed for private data collectors to share his infor-
mation to national security operations. 119 He argued that the initial transfer po-
tentially endangered his privacy, rather than protecting it as legally required.120 
In October 2015, in Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner (Schrems I), the 
CJEU agreed, holding that the Safe Harbor adequacy decision was “invalid” 
because it did not meet the EU’s standard for “adequate” protection. 121 
In voiding Safe Harbor, the CJEU focused on the inherent conflict be-
tween the agreement and the privacy protections afforded by EU law.122 Name-
                                                                                                          
transferred their data to another entity. See id. (explaining the Safe Harbor Principle: “Onward Trans-
fer”). (4) Data collectors were responsible for properly securing the personal data they collected. See 
id. (explaining the Safe Harbor Principle: “Security”). (5) Additionally, they are limited to the use of 
data that was correct and used exclusively for pertinent objectives. See id. (explaining the Safe Harbor 
Principle: “Data Integrity”). (6) Individuals could “access” their collected personal data and rectify or 
erase it . See id. (explaining the Safe Harbor Principle: “Access”). (7) Lastly, there had to be a system 
to ensure the compliance of participating entities. See id. (explaining the Safe Harbor Principle: “En-
forcement”). 
 118 See Case C–362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r (Schrems I), ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 28 
(Oct. 6, 2015) (providing background to the case brought by Schrems in 2013); Commission Decision 
2000/520, supra note 113, art. 1, at 8 (deeming the Safe Harbor mechanism to be “ adequate”) .  
Schrems took issue with a local Facebook subsidiary transferring the data it collected to its US corpo-
rate parent, Facebook Inc. Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 28. He, thus, filed a complaint with the 
Data Protection Commissioner of Ireland (commissioner). Id. The commissioner denied Schrems’ 
request, and was ultimately sued by Schrems for doing so. Id. ¶¶ 29–30. Although Schrems did not 
directly question the Safe Harbor adequacy determination, the High Court of Ireland concluded that its 
legal assessment was necessary to resolve the suit . Id. ¶ 35. 
 119 Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 28. The scrutiny of US privacy protection on a global 
stage began in 2013 when a Central Intelligence Agency employee, Edward Snowden, divulged the 
US National Security Agency (NSA)’s practices to reporters. See Dave Davies, Edward Snowden 
Speaks Out: ‘I Haven’t and I Won’t’ Cooperate with Russia, NPR (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.npr.
org/2019/09/19/761918152/exiled-nsa-contractor-edward-snowden-i-haven-t-and-i-won-t-cooperate-
with-russia [https://perma.cc/3DPD-8W22] (recounting Snowden going to Hong Kong to reveal high-
ly confidential NSA documents to three reporters); Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: The 
Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations, THE GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance [https://
perma.cc/6F5Y-RCF7] (disclosing that Snowden was the “whistleblower” behind the unprecedented 
NSA scandal). 
 120 See Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 67 (addressing his suspicion that the US could not 
afford Europeans the “adequate . . . protection” required by law). Specifically, Schrems contended that 
the US lacked the legal foundation to guarantee rights afforded to him by Directive 95/46/EC. See id. 
In 1995, the European Parliament developed Directive 95/46/EC to better protect European data as it 
travelled between European countries. EU Data Protection Directive, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://
epic.org/privacy/intl/eu_data_protection_directive.html [https://perma.cc/LE8G-C3LL]. 
 121 See Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 106 (concluding that the Safe Harbor adequacy de-
termination was not proper); id. ¶ 67 (implicating that the “validity” of Safe Harbor depended on its 
ability to properly protect European data). Specifically, the CJEU focused its attention on Articles 1 
and 3 of the Safe Harbor adequacy determination. Id. ¶¶ 79, 99. 
 122 See id. ¶¶ 3–9 (introducing the CJEU’s decision to invalidate Safe Harbor with the provisions 
of Directive 95/46/EC and Commission Decision 2000/520). The CJEU referenced parts of the legis-
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ly, the court took issue with the fact that a US corporation could ignore Safe 
Harbor requirements when transferring data to a potentially non-compliant 
public authority. 123 The US security authorities’ overreach allowed their im-
proper access to European data and contradicted the purpose of the Safe Har-
bor agreement. 124 More concerningly, EU citizens had no meaningful legal 
recourse. 125 Furthermore, the Safe Harbor adequacy decision itself failed to 
assert that US regulations or agreements would sufficiently protect the integri-
ty of EU personal data. 126 Although the EU did not necessarily require foreign 
                                                                                                          
lation to show the protective and broad nature of Directive 95/46/EC and Commission Decisio n 
2000/520. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 3–4 (“[D]ata-processing systems are designed to serve man.” (quoting Di-
rective 95/46/EC, supra note 83, recital 2, at 31)); id. ¶ 4 (“Member States shall protect the fundamen-
tal rights and freedoms of natural persons . . . with respect to the processing of personal data.” (quot-
ing Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 83, art. 1, at 38)). 
 123 See id. ¶¶ 82, 86 (outlining the possibility for a US business that participated in Safe Harbor to 
nevertheless transfer data that it collected from the EU to a non-compliant public entity). US “national 
security, public interest,” and “law enforcement” took precedence to any requirement of Safe Harbor. 
Safe Harbor Privacy Principles Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce on July 21, 2000, supra 
note 117; see Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 86 (emphasizing this caveat in its invalidation of the 
agreement). Additionally, “public authorities” that obtained the information would be under no obliga-
tion to comply with the agreement. Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶¶ 82, 93. An organizatio n 
could, thus, plausibly be obligated to make a transfer that was in direct violation of the Safe Harbor 
principles to an entity that was likewise not bound to meet EU standards. See id. at ¶¶ 82–86 (identify-
ing US legislation to be at odds with actual “adequacy”). 
 124 See Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 90 (claiming that national organizations in the US 
overindulged in their use of personal data); U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 111 (explain-
ing that Safe Harbor purported to balance personal privacy needs with economic ones). In 2013, the 
Commission assessed US security authorities to determine how they made use of their access to per-
sonal data. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Re-
building Trust in EU-US Data Flows, COM (2013) 846 final (Nov. 11, 2013); Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour 
from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU, COM (2013) 847 final 
(Nov. 11, 2013). It concluded that these organizations used data more than was “necessary and pro-
portionate” to address actual security needs. Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 22. The Commission 
further found that Europeans had no way to properly address potential abuses of their privacy rights. 
Id. ¶ 23. 
 125 See Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶¶ 89–90, 95 (expressing concern that neither the US 
government nor legal system would effectively address EU privacy complaints). The CJEU lamented 
that the FTC’s oversight of mercantile litigation was inapplicable to individuals. Id. ¶ 89. Additional-
ly, there was no way for Europeans to challenge potential abuses in court. Id. ¶ 90. The court conclud-
ed that the lack of redressability was inconsistent with EU legislation. See id. ¶ 95 (“[L]egislation not 
providing for any possibility . . . to pursue legal remedies . . . does not respect the essence of the fun-
damental right to effective judicial protection . . . .”). 
 126 Id. ¶¶ 96–97. The Safe Harbor adequacy determination lacked any explicit statement that the 
US “ensure[d]” that its regulations would properly protect personal data. See Commission Decision 
2000/520, supra note 113, recitals 2, 5, at 7 (omitting such a provision). The CJEU claimed that this 
alone would have been sufficient to invalidate the agreement. Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 98. 
The court, nevertheless, continued to assess the contents of the agreement to provide a more-detailed 
invalidation. See generally id. ¶¶ 99–106 (continuing to evaluate Article 3 of Commission Decision 
2000/520). 
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countries to match its exact privacy standards, it demanded that they have “es-
sentially equivalent” protections to those in the EU. 127 
Following this decision, US entities could no longer lawfully obtain data 
from the EU by participating in the Safe Harbor program. 128 The EU and US 
therefore worked to quickly renegotiate a new mechanism to provide another 
adequacy classification. 129 The heir to Safe Harbor began its reign in August of 
the following year. 130 
D. Déjà Vu All Over Again: Schrems II Ends Privacy Shield and 
Diminishes the Strength of SCCs 
Privacy Shield, the successor mechanism to Safe Harbor, was operational 
several months after Schrems I in 2016. 131 The EU and US drafted this agree-
ment on similar core principles of data protection to those of Safe Harbor.132 
                                                                                                          
 127 Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 73. The court conceded that, because the law required a 
foreign country’s standards to be “adequate,” it  could not then demand them to be “identical” to the 
EU. Id. Compare Adequate, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/
english/adequate [https://perma.cc/5NER-9E35] (providing the term’s degree of comparability to be 
“enough or satisfactory for a particular purpose”), with Identical, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://
dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/identical [https://perma.cc/4W8Z-ZVH7] (showing the 
heightened requirement to be “exactly the same”). Essential equivalence requires: (1) clarity and ac-
cessibility; (2) minimization; (3) completely autonomous supervision; and (4) a means to rectify po-
tential abuses in court. See Statement of the Article 29 Working Party on the Consequences of th e 
Schrems Judgment, CNIL (Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.cnil.fr/en/statement-article-29-working-party-
consequences-schrems-judgment [https://perma.cc/URF9-8GDB] (assessing the Schrems I decision to 
hypothesize the requirements for a valid agreement after the decision). 
 128 Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 106; see U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 111 
(detailing the mechanism which, prior to Schrems I, allowed for data transfers between the EU and 
US). See generally Courtney M. Bowman, US-EU Safe Harbor Invalidated: What Now?, PROSKAUER 
(Oct. 6, 2015), https://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2015/10/articles/european-union/us-eu-safe-harbor-
invalidated-what-now/ [https://perma.cc/Y9BC-C28L] (discussing the impact that Schrems I had on 
the EU when it  ceased the availability of the only national data-transfer mechanism, Safe Harbor). 
 129 See Chander, supra note 110, at 773 (stating that the EU and US developed Privacy Shield one 
year after Schrems I invalidated Safe Harbor). 
 130 See Privacy Shield Overview, supra note 110 (referencing the Privacy Shield’s adequacy de-
termination on July 12, 2016); see Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250, of 12 July 
2016 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy 
of the Protection Provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, art. 1, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 1, 35 (EC) (find-
ing Privacy Shield to be “adequate”); MILDEBRATH, supra note 12 (labeling Privacy Shield as a “re-
placement” to Safe Harbor). 
 131 Privacy Shield Overview, supra note 110. Much like Safe Harbor, the Commission cleared 
Privacy Shield during its required adequacy determination. See Commission Implementing Decision 
2016/1250, supra note 130, art. 1, at 35 (giving the Commission’s accepting opinion of the updated 
framework). Privacy Shield was negotiated during the Obama Administration. Chander, supra note 
110, at 773. 
 132 EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework Principles Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
supra note 5 (explaining the core Privacy Shield Principles: (1) “Notice,” (2) “Choice,” (3) “Account-
ability for Onward Transfer,” (4) “Security,” (5) “Data Integrity and Purpose Limitation,” (6) “Ac-
cess,” and (7) “Recourse, Enforcement and Liability”); see U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, supra 
2596 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2573 
With Privacy Shield, the Department of Commerce restated the guiding stand-
ards while further emphasizing the legal responsibility of US data collectors to 
protect Europeans’ personal information and minimize the data that they col-
lect. 133 Additionally, in response to redressability concerns brought forth in the 
Schrems I decision, the Privacy Shield mechanism established an “[o]mbuds-
person,” responsible for arbitrating the US-based privacy concerns of those 
protected under EU law. 134 Despite some public disapproval, the Commission 
deemed Privacy Shield to be “adequate.”135 But Schrems remained unsatisfied 
with the new agreement and continued to bring legal challenges regarding the 
validity of data transfers between the EU and US. 136 
                                                                                                          
note 111 (overviewing the Safe Harbor agreement and its principles); supra note 117 and accompany-
ing text (explaining the seven Safe Harbor principles). 
 133 See EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework Principles Issued by the U.S. Department of Com-
merce, supra note 5 (emphasizing the importance of compliance by participants to uphold the values 
of the Privacy Shield principles). For example, the FTC could pursue and enforce Privacy Sh ield 
against any organization that failed to adhere to its terms. Id. Section 5(a) of the FTC Act generally 
provides regulation to “unfair or deceptive acts” that may occur in the trade of business. See Federal 
Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (providing the legal standard for unfair prac-
tice). In addition to the main seven principles, Privacy Shield included sixteen additional requirements 
for its members. See EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework Principles Issued by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, supra note 5 (giving additional explanations for: (1) “Sensitive Data”; (2) “Journalistic 
Exceptions”; (3) “Secondary Liability”; (4) “Performing Due Diligence and Conducting Audits”; (5) 
“The Role of the Data Protection Authorities”; (6) “Self-Certification”; (7) “Verification”; (8) “Ac-
cess”; (9) “Human Resources Data”; (10) Obligatory Contracts for Onward Transfers; (11) “Dispute 
Resolution and Enforcement”; (12) “Choice—Timing of Opt Out”; (13) “Travel Information”; (14) 
“Pharmaceutical and Medical Products”; (15) “Public Record and Publicly Available Information”; 
and (16) “Access Requests by Public Authorities”). 
 134 See Case C–311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. (Schrems II), ECLI :EU:C:
2020:559, ¶¶ 43, 45 (July 16, 2020) (explaining the implementation of the “Ombudsperson” in Priva-
cy Shield); Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250, supra note 130, annex A, at 7 2  
(approving this addition as being sufficient to meet EU standards); Mark Young & Sam Jun gy un  
Choi, Privacy Shield Ombudsperson Confirmed by the Senate, COVINGTON (June 25, 2019), https://
www.insideprivacy.com/cross-border-transfers/privacy-shield-ombudsperson-confirmed-by-the-senate/ 
[https://perma.cc/YDC5-SBR7] (discussing the role that the first ombudsperson, Keith Krach, would play 
in enforcing Privacy Shield). The ombudsperson was designed to act as an entity that was separate from 
US national intelligence and surveillance. Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 43. The role was to over-
see any complaint that may be brought by a European concerning US data practices. Privacy Shield 
Ombudsperson, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., https://www.state.gov/privacy-shield-ombudsperson/ [https://
perma.cc/4X5C-GRZ3]. EU constituents did not need to show that any person or entity h ad “ ac-
cessed” or abused their personal data to file complaints. Maldoff & Tene, supra note 74, at 238. 
 135 Commission Implementing (EU) Decision 2016/1250, supra note 130, art. 1, at 35. 
 136 See MILDEBRATH, supra note 12 (describing the sequence of events that led to the Schrems II 
complaint). Notably, the original complaint for Schrems II was made prior to the enactment of Privacy 
Shield. Id. Initially, Schrems brought a challenge to the Irish Data Protection Authority based solely 
on Facebook Ireland’s continued use of SCCs to transfer data to the US after Schrems I .  Id.  The 
Commission deemed SCCs “adequate” in 2010. Commission Decision 2010/87, of 5 February 2010 
on Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Personal Data to Processors Established in Third 
Countries Under Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, art. 1, 2010 O.J. 
(L 39) 5, 8 (EU). By the time Schrems II reached the CJEU, Privacy Shield had received its own ade-
quacy determination and was in full force. See MILDEBRATH, supra note 12 (noting the coinciding 
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In July 2020, in Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Ltd. 
(Schrems II), the CJEU invalidated Privacy Shield as a mechanism for transat-
lantic personal data transfers. 137 Similar to its Schrems I decision, the c ourt 
focused on the US’s failure to safeguard personal data in a manner that w as  
“essentially equivalent” to the standard required by the EU. 138 It found that 
Privacy Shield was still insufficient for EU privacy requirements. 139 In part, 
the court reasoned that US surveillance laws fell short of the EU standard that 
the collection and use of personal data be both “necessary” and “proportion-
al[]” to its objective. 140 This determination hinged on the lack of restrictions 
placed on national surveillance groups and their ability to meddle with person-
al data existing in the US. 141 The court further found the addition of an ombud-
                                                                                                          
rise and demise of Privacy Shield). Thus, the CJEU used this opportunity to assess both data-transfer 
mechanisms in one decision. Id.; see Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 66 (addressing the choice to 
decide the validity of the adequacy determinations for both SCCs and Privacy Shield). 
 137 Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 201. Although Schrems and Facebook Ireland Ltd. were 
the primary parties to this decision, the US, the Electronic Privacy Information Centre, the BSA Busi-
ness Software Alliance Inc., and Digitaleurope all acted as intervening parties during the proceeding. 
See generally id. (listing all relevant parties). In September 2020, the sister decision to Schrems II saw 
a similar outcome regarding the functional equivalent to Privacy Shield that existed between the US 
and Switzerland. FED. DATA PROT. & INFO. COMM’R, POLICY PAPER ON THE TRANSFER OF PERSON-
AL DATA TO THE USA AND OTHER COUNTRIES LACKING AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF DATA PROTEC-
TION WITHIN THE MEANING OF ART. 6 PARA. 1 SWISS FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION 5 –7 
(Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/64261.pdf [https://perma.
cc/BVT5-UNXX]. 
 138 See Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 105 (referencing the requirement in EU privacy legis-
lation that a country’s standards must be “essentially equivalent” to the EU’s to be sufficient). 
 139 Id. ¶ 201. Unlike in Schrems I, the court in Schrems II relied on the GDPR to set benchmarks 
for EU standards. Compare id. ¶ 202 (expressly citing the provisions of Article 46 of the GDPR), with 
Case C–362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r (Schrems I), ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (Oct. 6, 2015) (con-
taining no reference to the GDPR). Although the GDPR was far into its development at the time of the 
Schrems I decision, it was not fully implemented until three years later. Wolford, supra note 77. It was, 
thus, only applicable law for the Schrems II decision. See generally Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 
(occurring in 2020, four years after the EU adopted the GDPR). 
 140 See Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 176 (describing the requirements of EU law). First, 
the use of personal data must be restricted to the minimum that is needed for some goal. Necessity & 
Proportionality, EURO. DATA PROT. SUPERVISOR, https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/our-work/
subjects/necessity-proportionality_en [https://perma.cc/7R2Y-U7QR]. Second, there must be an equi-
librium between the extent to which data is collected and used and the reason that it was necessary. Id. 
In precise terms, data collection is only “proportional[]” if the “disadvantages” to the individual do not 
surpass the “advantages” to the authority. Id. 
 141 See Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 65 (commenting that US surveillance practices were 
especially concerning to the EU because Europeans were not privy to the constitutional protections an 
American citizen held to prevent or remedy privacy harms). In part, the CJEU looked to the broad 
abilit ies granted to the NSA in Executive Order 12,3333 (E.O. 12,333). Id. President Ronald Regan 
introduced E.O. 12,3333 in 1981 to provide US surveillance programs extensive abilities to act, col-
lect, and use security intelligence in ways that would elsewise be unlawful. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 
46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981); see also Executive Order 123333, ELEC. PRIV.  I NFO.  CTR. ,  
https://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/12333/ [https://perma.cc/9PX5-YP6B] (giving additional back-
ground to the order). Although E.O. 12,3333 has been amended several t imes throughout histo ry,  
these changes have only increased the power of surveillance programs and widened it s ro le as a  
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sperson as an arbitrator to be an insufficient improvement from Safe Harbor, 
because the position’s autonomy and ability to make compulsory decis ions  
was questionable. 142 The court was especially concerned that this role’s close 
tie with US intelligence compromised its ability to protect EU citizens. 143 
In the same opinion, the court affirmed a different adequacy decis ion,  
which stated that standard contractual clauses (SCCs) can be a valid mecha-
nism for personal data transfers.144 SCCs are set clauses that businesses can 
adopt into a contract to properly protect their data transfers. 145 EU and US 
companies can use them to require safeguarding of data transfers because 
SSCs are internally binding and enforceable on the parties. 146 And because the 
Commission must institute the SCCs, this mechanism can serve as an alterna-
                                                                                                          
catchall provision for government intelligence activity. See, e.g., Executive Order 12333, supra (not-
ing the 2008 amendment by President George Bush to augment the already significant capabilities of 
the Director of National Intelligence). 
 142 Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 195. The Privacy Shield framework instituted the ombud-
sperson position. Id. ¶ 43. This position purported to be an uninfluenced and self-authoritative entity 
that was separate from US intelligence programs. Id. Thus, any suspicion that the court had as to the 
position’s independence was directly counter-intuitive to its purpose. See id. ¶¶ 43, 195. 
 143 Id. ¶ 195. 
 144 Id. ¶¶ 124, 149; see Commission Decision 2010/87, supra note 136, art. 1, at 8 (finding stand-
ard contractual clauses to be “adequate safeguards” for data transfers). The Commission determines 
which collections of SCCs are appropriate for businesses to adopt into their contracts to permissibly 
trade data through Commission decisions. Standard Contractual Clauses (SCC), EUR. CO MM’ N,  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-protection/
standard-contractual-clauses-scc_en [https://perma.cc/GWN6-W58F] (commenting on the Commis-
sion’s role in approving SCCs); see Steve Vella, Why Use the Standard Contractual Clauses?, GTG 
ADVOCS. (July 26, 2019), https://www.gtgadvocates.com/why-use-the-standard-contractual-clauses/ 
[https://perma.cc/A2YY-UDQW] (introducing the various SCCs that the Commission has introduced). 
Prior to Schrems II, the Commission had approved three groupings of clauses. Vella, supra. See gen-
erally Commission Decision 2010/87, supra note 136 (providing for SCCs as an adequate mecha-
nism); Commission Decision 2004/915, of 27 December 2004 Amending Decision 2001/497/EC as 
Regards the Introduction of an Alternative Set of Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of 
Personal Data to Third Countries, 2004 O.J. (L 385) 74 (EC) (offering an “alternative set of standard 
contractual clauses” to an earlier 2001 decision); Commission Decision 2001/497, 2001 O.J. (L 181) 
19 (EC) (issuing, for the first time, a group of SCCs that would allow lawful transfers to foreign coun-
tries according to the requirements in Directive 95/46/EC). In light of the Schrems II decision, the  
Commission released a new decision updating the older SCCs. See generally Commission Implement-
ing Decision (EU) 2021/914, of 4 June 2021 on Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Per-
sonal Data to Third Countries Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2016/678 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, 2021 O.J. (L 199) 31, 31–32 (broadening the applicability of SCCs to four different 
“module[s]” for international data transactions). 
 145 Szép, supra note 9, at 46; see Whitney, supra note 90 (giving background to SCCs). SCCs are 
also called “model contractual clauses.” Whitney, supra note 90. 
 146 Vella, supra note 144 (outlining what SCCs are and how to use them); see  S chrems I I , 
ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 124 (discussing the Commission’s decision on the validity of SCCs). Imme-
diately following the Schrems I decision, there was concern that the ruling would effectuate a com-
plete standstill in transatlantic data transfers. See Boardman et al., supra note 30 (addressing several 
questions arising from the invalidation of Safe Harbor). There were, nevertheless, “other legal bases” 
for data to continue being transferred. Id. SCCs are one of those bases. Vella, supra note 144. 
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tive to establish “adequacy” for importing personal data from the EU to the 
US. 147 
In the absence of a country-wide negotiated transatlantic mec hanism,  
SCCs have been the best alternative to make a lawful transfer. 148 Nevertheless, 
the CJEU was not receptive to the absolute legality of this mechanism,  and 
made its lawful application incredibly stringent. 149 The adequacy of an SCC 
would depend on the requesting party’s national standard. 150 The court, how-
ever, was unclear on how to ensure the validity of a data transfer when using 
SCCs. 151 Instead, the court required an individual evaluation to ensure the law-
fulness of transfer. 152 This means that the utility of SCCs remains uncertain.153 
                                                                                                          
 147 See Szép, supra note 9, at 46 (discussing the Commission’s role in enacting SCCs); Alexander 
Zinser, The European Commission Decision on Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer o f 
Personal Data to Third Countries: An Effective Solution?, 3 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 24, 25 (2003) 
(explaining that the SCCs are mechanisms that may be used for “adequacy”). Successful SCCs will: 
(1) guarantee a substantial amount of protection that meets the standards of EU law; (2) support the 
needs of individuals whose data is used or processed; and (3) enforce any liability that may arise from 
provisional breaches. Id. There were, nevertheless, several exemptions to Directive 95/46. See Directive 
95/46/EC, supra note 83, art. 26, at 46. For example, data could be lawfully transmitted to a country that 
is not “adequate” if the person gave unequivocal permission for it to occur. Id. art. 26(a), at 46. 
 Another popular and alternative mechanism is BCRs. Szép, supra note 9, at 46. BCRs are dissim-
ilar to SCCs for several reasons. Id. Although SCCs are exclusively Commission-implemented, BCRs 
are more akin to “a code of conduct” that must be followed for sufficient protection to be met. Whit-
ney, supra note 90. Further, BCRs are initiated by the individual entity and must thereafter be ap -
proved by the proper EU data privacy administration to be valid. Id. 
 148 See Boardman et al., supra note 30 (discussing the viability of alternative mechanisms, such as 
SCCs and BCRs, and concluding that SCCs are likely better to use than BCRs). 
 149 See Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 125–126, 134 (commenting that the adequacy of 
SCCs may depend on a “case-by-case” evaluation that considers the sufficiency of law in the busi-
ness’s home-country). 
 150 Id. The court concluded that SCCs are not “per se” valid or invalid. MILDEBRATH, supra note 
12. Rather, the mechanism could have varying degrees of sufficiency. See id. (noting that SCCs’ va-
lidity depends on the safeguards offered by the business in combination with the protections from the 
foreign country). 
 151 See Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 133 (explaining that SCCs may be insufficient to 
protect European data, but failing to describe what “supplementary measures” would be necessary to 
do so). SCCs are cookie-cutter agreements approved by the Commission that may effectively be cop-
ied and pasted into transatlantic data trade contracts. See id. (noting that SCCs do not vary from coun-
try to country). Thus, the court reasoned that the sufficiency of SCCs might depend on the nationality 
of the foreign entity and the degree of additional protection afforded by its home country’s laws. Id. 
An entity based in a country with higher data privacy standards would thereby require less augmenta-
tion to be compliant with the EU. See id. (proposing that external national standards continue to play a 
role in individualized adequacy). The burden rests on the organizations to make sure that there  is 
proper protection before trading the data. See id. at ¶¶ 134, 142 (obligating data “controller[s]” t o 
“verify [that] . . . adequate protection” will be met “prior to any transfer” of data). 
 152 Christopher Kuner, The Schrems II Judgment of the Court of Justice and the Future of Data 
Transfer Regulation, EUR. L. BLOG (July 17, 2020), https://europeanlawblog.eu/2020/07/17/th e-
schrems-ii-judgment-of-the-court-of-justice-and-the-future-of-data-transfer-regulation/ [https://perma.
cc/RK6G-RB4W]. Because the requirements for one organization to make transfers lawfully may be 
different from those of another, using SCCs requires “mini adequacy decisions” for each entity. Id. 
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Therefore, Schrems II created significant ambiguity for the EU and the US to 
clarify to guarantee the future of transatlantic data trading. 154 
II. WHERE SHOULD WE BEGIN: THE SCHREMS II DECISION ASKS  
THE EU AND US TO RE-STRIKE THE BALANCE BETWEEN  
PRIVACY AND PROFITABILITY 
The CJEU’s invalidation of the Privacy Shield in Data Protection Com-
missioner v. Facebook Ireland Ltd. (Schrems II) in July 2020 re-opened the 
dialogue about the intricacy of privacy legislation and accentuated the interna-
tional and intranational differences among data regulations. 155 Section A of this 
Part examines the incentives and deterrents that the EU and US face in light of 
the CJEU’s invalidation of Privacy Shield in Schrems II. 156 Section B briefly 
surveys US states for privacy legislation that supplements the federal s tand-
ard. 157 Section C considers the recent privacy regulations promulgated in Cali-
fornia, which make it the strictest regulator of personal information in the US.158 
A. Without Privacy Shield, the EU and US Must Determine  
What Comes Next 
Since the CJEU struck down Privacy Shield in July 2020, both the EU 
and the US have been left to question the future of a new transatlantic  data 
trading mechanism. 159 Subsection 1 of this Section presents the general senti-
ments of the EU and US governments towards renegotiation. 160 Subsection 2 
discusses the alternative mechanisms used for data transfers in the absence of 
                                                                                                          
When using SCCs, it  is the duty of the organization to determine whether there is proper protection in 
place. Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 134. 
 153 See Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 125–126 (limiting SCCs to situational applicability). 
 154 See Ryan Chiavetta, The Post-‘Schrems II’ Road Isn’t Clear, but Privacy Pros Can Still Take 
Steps Forward, IAPP (Dec. 15, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/the-road-isnt-clear-but-privacy-pros-
can-still-take-steps-forward-post-schrems-ii/ [https://perma.cc/NB43-GUZD] (commenting that busi-
nesses were perplexed and worried about what to do immediately following the Schrems II opinion). 
 155 See Case C–311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. (Schrems II), ECLI:EU:C:2020:
559, ¶ 201 (July 16, 2020) (invalidating Privacy Shield in July 2020). 
 156 See infra notes 159–197 and accompanying text. 
 157 See infra notes 198–206 and accompanying text. 
 158 See infra notes 207–215 and accompanying text. 
 159 Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 201; see Carol A.F. Umhoefer & An drew Serwin ,  
Schrems II: Now What? New FAQs from EU Data Protection Supervisors Provide Guidance on Data 
Transfers, DLA PIPER (July 28, 2020), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2020/
07/schrems-ii-now-what-new-faqs-from-eu-data-protection-supervisors-provide-guidance-on-data-
transfers/ [https://perma.cc/WV6F-E23R] (calling the Schrems II decision confusing to process). 
 160 See infra notes 163–175 and accompanying text. 
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Safe Harbor and Privacy Shield. 161 Subsection 3 addresses one of the largest 
concerns presented by the EU–US surveillance legislation. 162 
1. The EU and US Generally Desire a New Agreement 
Schrems II left the corporate market with a significant burden that was in-
stantly enforceable. 163 In quick response to the decision invalidating Privacy 
Shield, the US Department of Commerce and the Commission issued a joint 
statement pledging their intent to find and renegotiate an alternative agree-
ment. 164 The declaration acknowledged the difficult balance between individu-
al privacy protection and economic prosperity, but also committed to finding a 
viable replacement to the mechanism. 165 
The US has advocated for the expeditious renegotiation of a transatlantic 
data transfer mechanism.166 The same day that the Schrems II decision w as  
released, the US Secretary of Commerce published a statement acknowledging 
the agency’s dissatisfaction with the invalidation of Privacy Shield. 167 It also 
stated that the US would learn from Schrems II. 168 The statement emphasized 
the department’s concern over the sweeping ramifications that the dec is ion 
would have on American businesses, as well as the need to find an alternative 
quickly. 169 In a similar statement, the US Secretary of State reaffirmed the De-
                                                                                                          
 161 See infra notes 176–186 and accompanying text. 
 162 See infra notes 187–197 and accompanying text. 
 163 See Edgar Hidalgo et al., The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Invalidated: What It Means for U.S. 
Companies, JD SUPRA (July 17, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-eu-u-s-privacy-shield-
invalidated-74627/ [https://perma.cc/4TNM-KZAB] (commenting on the immediacy of the implica-
tions of Schrems II). 
 164 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Com., supra note 11(stating that the EU and US had already 
begun to consider the replacement for Privacy Shield shortly after the Schrems II decision). 
 165 See id. (remarking on the significance of both an individual’s ability to safeguard information 
and the economic struggles faced worldwide caused by COVID-19). 
 166 See MILDEBRATH, supra note 12 (mentioning the urgency expressed by US officials in con-
nection with the ongoing economic struggles faced by the US in 2020). 
 167 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Com., U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross Statement 
on Schrems II Ruling and the Importance of EU–U.S. Data Flows (July 16, 2020), https://useu.us
mission.gov/u-s-secretary-of-commerce-wilbur-ross-statement-on-schrems-ii-ruling-and-the-importance-
of-eu-u-s-data-flows/ [https://perma.cc/ES7U-CNAH] (lamenting the CJEU’s decision to strike down 
the Privacy Shield mechanism). 
 168 See id. (assuring that the US Department of Commerce would work with the EU to minimize 
the repercussions of Schrems II). 
 169 See id. (stating that all businesses and trades rely on their ability to sell information interna-
tionally). Notably, at the time of invalidation, the Privacy Shield program hosted and supported more 
than 5,300 US companies. Id. Ross also commented on the department’s intention to carry on with 
Privacy Shield, despite its inapplicability to EU data transfers. See id. (allowing the program to pro-
ceed after the Schrems II decision). 
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partment of Commerce’s apprehension toward the lasting effect that stifling 
international personal data trade would have on the economy. 170 
The EU expressed similar sentiments favoring the preservation of interna-
tional data trade with the US. 171 The EU, however, simultaneously acknowl-
edged that it would not compromise individual protection for the sake of eco-
nomic viability. 172 Vice-President Vera Jourová of the Commission for Values 
and Transparency released a statement acknowledging the uncertainty caused 
by the Schrems II decision for both EU and US businesses alike. 173 She pro-
posed that they could use the ruling as a resource to understand how best to 
move forward with a transatlantic agreement. 174 The Commissioner for Justice 
Didier Reynders furthered the Vice-President’s remarks by suggesting that a 
focus on alternative mechanisms may be the most effective way to solidify the 
transatlantic data trade. 175 
2. The Feasibility of SCCs to Regulate the Transatlantic Data Trade 
Without Safe Harbor or Privacy Shield, both European and American 
businesses have had to seek legal shelter in substitute structures.176 One alter-
native that the EU and US could focus a future agreement on are SCCs. 177 
Schrems II specifically upheld the possibility for an entity to make a lawful 
                                                                                                          
 170 Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y, Dep’t of State, European Court of Justice Invali-
dates EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (July 17, 2020), https://ee.usembassy.gov/2020-07-20-1/ [https://perma.
cc/JM3X-A4U7] (expressing concern over the millions of workers impacted). The transatlantic data 
trade is worth more than $7.1 trillion dollars. Id. 
 171 See Press Statement, Eur. Comm’n, Opening Remarks by Vice-President Jourová and Com-
missioner Reynders at the Press Point Following the Judgment in Case C-311/18 Facebook Ireland 
and Schrems (July 16, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_20_
1366 [https://perma.cc/47VJ-PBWE] (attempting to calm the concerns from European and American 
businesses in the wake of Schrems II by assuring them that transatlantic data trade will proceed). 
 172 See id. (stating Vice-President Jourová’s claim that the Schrems II decision also reaffirmed the 
notion that the EU would fight to protect European data extraterritorially). Jourová claimed that the 
future of transatlantic data trade would need to be consistent with: (1) Schrems II; (2) EU legislation; 
and (3) the inherent human right to privacy. See id. (enumerating the Vice-President’s guarantees to 
Europeans in any ensuing agreement). 
 173 See id. (noting the confusing implications of Schrems II for businesses). 
 174 See id. (claiming that the EU and US will be able to use the Schrems II dicta and holding to 
build a better arrangement moving forward). 
 175 See id. (praising the court for allowing SCCs to stand after Schrems II). 
 176 See Szép, supra note 9, at 46 (stating that, in the absence of Privacy Shield, businesses must 
use surrogate arrangements, like SCCs and BCRs); see, e.g., Cooper et al., supra note 110 (acknowl-
edging that after Schrems II, all businesses making data transfers from EU states to the US had to rely 
on other practices, such as SCCs, to continue). 
 177 See Press Statement, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 171 (praising the court for allowing SCCs to 
stand after Schrems II); see also supra notes 144–147 and accompanying text (defining and explaining 
SCCs). 
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data transfer without Privacy Shield by using these provisions. 178 The Com-
mission has shown great hope for SCCs as well. 179 Therefore, they are likely 
the best alternative and most reliable replacement. 180 
But there remains some suspicion about the viability of these alternative 
mechanisms in the absence of a broader transatlantic data trade agreement.181 
Shortly after Schrems II, the Commission acknowledged that the EU w ould 
need to update their SCCs if they were to continue as the substitute for a Priva-
cy Shield agreement. 182 One major concern is that older SCCs only apply to 
data transfers from EU controllers to another controller and EU controllers to 
EU processors, meaning that US processors cannot use them. 183 And, updated 
SCCs that do provide for US processors are incredibly new, not yet required, 
and their success remains unproven.184 Moreover, no SCCs necessarily ensure 
                                                                                                          
 178 Case C–311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. (Schrems II), ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, 
¶¶ 124, 149 (July 16, 2020). 
 179 See Press Statement, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 171 (noting Commissioner Reynders’ discus-
sion of SCCs as a potential replacement with necessary modifications). In November 2020, the Commis-
sion released a draft document for new SCCs that countries such as the US could use to achieve lawful 
data transfers. See Data Protection—Standard Contractual Clauses for Transferring Personal Data to 
Non-EU Countries (Implementing Act), EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/
have-your-say/initiatives/12741-Commission-Implementing-Decision-on-standard-contractual-clauses-
for-the-transfer-of-personal-data-to-third-countries [https://perma.cc/KQH6-W33C] (tracking the 
development of new SCCs produced by the EU after Schrems II). 
 180 See Boardman et al., supra note 30 (finding SCCs to be a more practical solution because 
common corporate approval requirements make them less complicated, more efficient, and less uncer-
tain than BCRs). Although not decided upon by the CJEU, BCRs should anticipate being assessed in a 
similar fashion to SCCs moving forward. See K Royal, The Privacy Shield Is Broken, ACC DOCKET 
(Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.accdocket.com/privacy-shield-broken [https://perma.cc/TCM4-AED8] 
(meshing the application of both mechanisms). 
 181 See Armingaud et al., supra note 90 (claiming that the CJEU’s decision to uphold SCCs may 
actually cause more problems than it resolved because their viability depends on the country’s regula-
tions, which the court simultaneously deemed inadequate). 
 182 See Press Statement, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 171 (noting Commissioner Reynders’ com-
ments that changes are necessary to update some more-antiquated aspects of SCCs). 
 183 See Royal, supra note 180 (advising that SCCs can only apply to US controllers and provide 
no support for inter-processor trading across the Atlantic). A “controller” is a business that decides: 
(1) to process personal data; (2) the reason to process it; and (3) in what way. What Is a Data Control-
ler or a Data Processor?, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection /
reform/rules-business-and-organisations/obligations/controller-processor/what-data-controller-or-
data-processor_en [https://perma.cc/4QVL-B4ZN]. Alternatively, a “processor” is a business that  
helps the controller accomplish its goals. Id. Processors act as contractors to controllers. Id. Neverthe-
less, a single organization can play both roles. See id. (providing two examples to better understand 
the roles of controllers and processors). 
 Theoretically, a data transfer could occur between: (1) an EU controller and a US controller; (2) 
an EU processor and a US controller; (3) an EU processor and a US processor; or (4) an EU controller 
and a US processor. See Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/914, supra note 144, at 32–
33 (contemplating those four possibilities). Businesses, however, may only use older SCCs in the first 
two scenarios. Royal, supra note 180. 
 184 See Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/914, supra note 144, at 32 (allowing the 
SCCs to apply to data transfers from the EU to processors in non-EU countries); Martin Braun et al. , 
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that a data trade will be lawful. 185 Notably, the Schrems II decision left open 
the possibility for SCCs to be permissible, but only when deemed adequate in 
conjunction with the country’s personal data practices and regulations. 186 
3. US Surveillance Presents a Significant Hurdle for Renegotiation 
When assessing the sufficiency of the US privacy regime, however, the 
EU has maintained particular concern with the country’s surveillance 
scheme. 187 Both the CJEU opinions in Schrems v. Data Protection Commis-
sioner (Schrems I) and Schrems II, in 2015 and 2020, respectively, foc used 
partly on US counter-intelligence practices to invalidate Safe Harbor and Pri-
vacy Shield. 188 Specifically, in Schrems II, the court focused on legislation,  
                                                                                                          
European Commission Adopts and Publishes New Standard Contractual Clauses for Interna tio nal 
Transfers of Personal Data, WILMERHALE (June 7, 2021), https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/
blogs/wilmerhale-privacy-and-cybersecurity-law/20210607-european-commission-adopts-and-
publishes-new-standard-contractual-clauses-for-international-transfers-of-personal-data [https://perma.
cc/5AAE-JS9M] (commenting that the adequacy of the updated SCCs is unclear because they are still 
early-stage). The Commission released new SCCs on June 4, 2021. Commission Implementing Deci-
sion (EU) 2021/914, supra note 144, at 31. The modernization effort sought to streamline SCCs into a 
standalone comprehensive decision. See Braun et al., supra (explaining that the directive included 
provisions for four different categories of data transfer in a single record). The most recent SCCs 
provide clauses for personal data transfers from an: (1) EU controller to a non-EU controller; (2) EU 
controller to a non-EU processor; (3) EU processor to a non-EU processor and sub-processor; and (4) 
EU processor to a non-EU controller. Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/914, supra note 
144, at 32–33. Additionally, Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/914 provided so me 
guidance to international data collectors in countries with more troublesome privacy laws, like the 
US—mainly that the less interaction the collector had with the government, the more likely it was to 
be compliant. See id. at 53 n.12 (stating that “different elements may be considered” to assess an enti-
ty’s adequacy, including “relevant and documented practical experience with prior instances of re-
quests for disclosure from public authorities, or the absence of such requests”). The new Commission 
did not require businesses to adopt the new SCCs immediately, rather allowing them until 2023 to 
convert over. Id. at 31. 
 185 See Umhoefer & Serwin, supra note 159 (emphasizing the fact that the CJEU merely conclud-
ed that SCCs could be used to make a lawful transfer, and not that they would guarantee one). The 
legality of a transfer using SCCs was tied closely to the adequacy of national regulations. See Case C–
311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. (Schrems II), ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 126 (July 16, 
2020) (showing that the validity SCCs depends on the laws provided by the relevant country). 
 186 See Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 126, 149 (holding that SCCs, when viewed in addi-
tion to national protections, can be valid); Umhoefer & Serwin, supra note 159 (commenting that the 
court’s holding was not as beneficial as it  might appear). 
 187 See Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 60, 61, 63, 65, 166, 178–81, 184, 192 (discussing 
the US surveillance law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), and its counterparts a t 
great length); Case C–362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r (Schrems I), ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 33 
(Oct. 6, 2015) (acknowledging some concern for US surveillance practices). 
 188 See Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 179–180 (leaning on US surveillance regulations 
and practical applications as a basis for its holding that Privacy Shield is unusable) ; S ch rems I ,  
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 30 (contemplating the lower court’s assessment of US federal security agen-
cies). 
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such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which allow s  for  
various US surveillance programs. 189 
First passed in 1978, FISA provides the US government with the ability to 
monitor individuals anonymously and, in fact, to do so without meeting proce-
dural standards elsewise required. 190 At its core, the federal law purported to 
balance the government’s need to safeguard the US with the privacy entitle-
ments provided by the Bill of Rights. 191 But, the scope of FISA’s reach has  
fluctuated over years, often broadening or shrinking in response to the public’s 
perception of national security. 192 The government, however, has always used 
the statute to collect personal and private information throughout its history.193 
                                                                                                          
 189 See Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 165 (explaining the court’s concern with section 702 
of FISA); Maldoff & Tene, supra note 74, at 227 (discussing the concern held by the CJEU that the 
US federal government would actively permit and promote the actions of the NSA). See generally 50 
U.S.C. § 1881a (providing section 702 of FISA, as amended, which specifically allows US surveil-
lance programs to investigate foreigners, like EU citizens). 
 190 See William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles in Haystacks, 88 
T EX. L. REV. 1633, 1633 (2010) (commenting that FISA removes the requirement that the US gov-
ernment meet usual “probable cause” standards, and replaces it with an altered standard). See general-
ly Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 106, 92 Stat. 1783, 
1793–95 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1806) (providing the US government with broad powers 
to surveil without disclosure that they are doing so). Congress has since updated and amended FISA 
with several pieces of legislation, including the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providin g 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT ACT) of 2001 
and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 
§§ 101–201, 122 Stat. 2436, 2437–70 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881–1885c) (amending 
FISA to include more ways for the government to obtain data); USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (providing for the counteraction of terrorism). Outside of FISA, the gov-
ernment must rationally suspect that an individual took part or would take part in a violation of the 
law to obtain such information. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring “probable cause” to inspect an 
individual or confiscate belongings); Jonathan Kim, Fourth Amendment, LEGAL INFO. INST. Para . 
II.B, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment [https://perma.cc/ZF8J-7A29] (June 2017) 
(explaining the standard in terms of a police investigation). But, under the protection of FISA, th e 
government need only demonstrate some suspicion that an individual is an agent to another country. 
See Banks, supra, at 1633 (discussing the difference between probable cause standards inside an d 
outside of the FISA umbrella). 
 191 See Banks, supra note 190, at 1633 (complimenting the early institution of FISA); William C. 
Banks, The Death of FISA, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1209, 1214 (2007) (begging the US government to re-
turn FISA back to its better-balanced intentions). 
 192 See Banks, supra note 191, at 1211–12 (providing a historic account of FISA limitations wax-
ing and waning). The Supreme Court began to reduce the scope of federal surveillance in the 1960s, 
fearing that it might over-impose on the privacy rights of Americans. See id. (citing the 1960s as a  
time that privacy rights shifted balance toward the individual). After Watergate, however, the  US 
adopted measures to prevent similar tapping from exposing the country to foreign powers. See id . 
(distinguishing the 1970s as a shift in balance back toward the government). Most significantly, in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11, the US adopted even broader legislation to provide the government with 
increased power to oversee the actions of suspected terrorists. See id. at 1212 (suggesting that th e 
2000s represented the largest shift in favor of the government’s powers under FISA). 
 193 See Warrantless Surveillance Under Section 702 of FISA, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/
national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/warrantless-surveillance-under-section-702-fisa [https://
perma.cc/B3QP-R55G] (detailing the government’s collection of personal data under the guise o f  
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Many, including the CJEU, have criticized FISA for compromising too far 
in favor of the government and leaving the people’s personal information vul-
nerable. 194 There are several known instances of the government directly sub-
verting its requirements to invade individual privacy. 195 Furthering the senti-
ment in Schrems I, the Schrems II decision blanketly sourced FISA’s current 
implementation as precluding the US from being “adequate” to use European 
data. 196 Consequently, US surveillance practices are necessarily an obstacle for 
the EU and US to renegotiate a sustainable data trading agreement. 197 
B. From Sea to Shining (Priva)Sea 
Another significant complication for reforming Privacy Shield is the lack 
of consistent data privacy regulation within the US’s borders.198 Because of the 
US’s two-tiered sovereignty structure, states are able to elevate their protec-
tions to a higher standard than that required by the federal government.199 As a 
                                                                                                          
FISA through a critical lens). Misuses of FISA and intrusions upon the privacy rights of individuals 
often disproportionally affect ethnic and cultural minorities. See id. (reporting on the inherently racist 
way that FISA has been used). In April 2018, Jake Laperruque, the senior counsel to the Constitution 
Project, an organization focused on government surveillance, testified to the House Committee on 
Appropriations’ Subcommittee on Defense that government officials often use surveillance programs to 
unacceptably prey upon certain religious groups without a substantial reason to do so. Jake Laperruque, 
In Support of Research and Reporting on the Disparate Use and Impact of FISA, POGO (Apr. 8, 2019), 
https://www.pogo.org/testimony/2019/04/in-support-of-research-and-reporting-on-the-disparate-use-
and-impact-of-fisa/ [https://perma.cc/2VG4-MZ7B]. These officials often use broad language of sur-
veillance statutes to shield their racist intrusions under the pretext of self-protection. Id. 
 194 See, e.g., Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 180 (bringing into question the amount of pow-
er that FISA provides to the government); Banks, supra note 191, at 1214 (suggesting that recent 
FISA practices did not properly account for fundamental civil liberties, including individual privacy). 
 195 See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://epic.
org/privacy/surveillance/fisa/#Overview [https://perma.cc/9HH2-3AQL] (citing “Crossfire Hurricane” 
as one instance of the FBI directly violating FISA). A more recent example of the government sub-
verting FISA occurred in 2016 through 2017 when the FBI investigated a Donald Trump presidential 
campaign official, Carter Page. See id. (discussing the unravelling of “Crossfire Hurricane”). Alt -
hough the agency could not and did not meet the requisite cause standards to monitor Page, the FBI 
proceeded to do so anyway. Id. At the conclusion of this scandal, the agency was merely accosted by a 
report that suggested that the FBI rework its practices to better comply in the future and guarantee that 
it  would properly document any other investigations that it  was pursuing. See id. 
 196 Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 180–181; see Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 30 
(stating that US surveillance may be a greater issue than addressed in the present case). 
 197 See Joshua P. Meltzer, Why Schrems II Requires US-EU Agreement on Surveillance and Pri-
vacy, BROOKINGS (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/why-schrems-ii-requires-us-
eu-agreement-on-surveillance-and-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/SHV3-6JBP] (commenting that a suc-
cessful agreement will require the EU and US to address the court’s clear issues with US surveillance 
practices). 
 198 See Voss, supra note 29, at 410 (contending that the lack of consistency in US data privacy 
legislation will be a source of struggle and monetary loss). 
 199 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing the constitutional Supremacy Clause that gives pref-
erence to federal regulation over state laws); Daunt, supra note 104 (distinguishing that, so long as 
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result, the privacy rights of American citizens can significantly depend on their 
state-level residency. 200 
The only US states that have passed broad privacy legislation are Califor-
nia, Colorado, and Virginia. 201 Delaware and Illinois also have impressive pri-
vacy regulations. 202 Several other states have recently introduced similar legis-
lation in their respective governments.203 Notwithstanding their attempts, the 
majority have not successfully passed those laws.204 Other states, like Wyo-
ming and Idaho, have notably few privacy laws and have made no attempt to 
pass comprehensive ones. 205 California has proven to be the national leader in 
this area and regulates data more stringently than any other US state. 206 
                                                                                                          
there are no conflicts between a state and federal law, a state can provide additional rights through 
legislation). 
 200 See Casey Leins, States with the Strongest Online Privacy Protections, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 23, 
2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2019-10-23/states-with-the-strongest-online-
privacy-laws [https://web.archive.org/web/20200112153331/https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
states/articles/2019-10-23/states-with-the-strongest-online-privacy-laws] (depicting the significant 
disparity between privacy regulations in higher and lower ranked US states). 
 201 US State Privacy Legislation Tracker: Bills Introduced 2021, IAAP, https://iapp.org/media/
pdf/resource_center/State_Comp_Privacy_Law_Chart.pdf [https://perma.cc/MT2J-GHQN] (Sept. 1, 
2021). California has passed two comprehensive privacy laws in recent years. See infra notes 207–214 
and accompanying text (discussing California’s privacy regulations in detail). In July 2021, Colorado 
passed Colorado Senate Bill 21-190, the “Colorado Privacy Act.” S.B. 21-190, 73d Gen. Assemb., 1st 
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2021); US State Privacy Legislation Tracker: Bills Introduced 2021, supra. Similar-
ly, in March 2021, Virginia passed the comprehensive Virginia Senate Bill 1392, called the “Consum-
er Data Protection Act.” S.B. 1392, 2021 Gen. Assemb., 1st Spec. Sess. (Va. 2021); US State Privacy 
Legislation Tracker: Bills Introduced 2021, supra. 
 202 See Paul Bischoff, Internet Privacy Laws by State: Which US States Best Pro tect Privacy 
Online?, COMPARITECH, https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/which-us-states-best-protect-
online-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/4MET-CMYY] (July 27, 2021) (ranking states by privacy protection 
and giving Illinois one of the top scores); Leins, supra note 200 (highlighting Delaware as a state that 
has better standards than most states in 2019). 
 203 US State Privacy Legislation Tracker: Bills Introduced 2021, supra note 201. 
 204 Id. Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania all have pending pro-
posed privacy legislation as of publication. Id. But, the legislation proposed in Alabama, Alaska, Ari-
zona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Dakota, Ok-
lahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia were all unsuccessful. Id. That means that, of 
twenty-four states, only three have succeeded in introducing large state privacy acts. Id. These bills 
may have failed because political parties tend to disagree on where best to draw the line for privacy 
regulation. See Kendra Clark, The Current State of US State Data Privacy Laws, THE DRUM (Apr. 26, 
2021), https://www.thedrum.com/news/2021/04/26/the-current-state-us-state-data-privacy-laws [https://
perma.cc/2E5M-XXEU] (commenting that recent privacy bills did not succeed because some advo-
cates felt  they went too far, while others felt they did not go far enough). 
 205 See Bischoff, supra note 202 (ranking those two states among the worst privacy regulators); 
US State Privacy Legislation Tracker: Bills Introduced 2021, supra note 201 (not including Wyoming 
or Idaho as states that brought privacy bills to their legislature). The state of Wyoming provided the 
least amount of additional privacy protection to its citizens, lagging significantly behind the nation’s 
frontrunners. See Leins, supra note 200 (scoring Wyoming last, and rating the state as fifteen times 
less protective than California). Mississippi also has worse privacy regulation than most states, but 
attempted to pass Mississippi Senate Bill 2612 on privacy legislation in 2021. Bischoff, supra note 
202; US State Privacy Legislation Tracker: Bills Introduced 2021, supra note 201. See generally S.B. 
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C. Take the 405 to Better Privacy Protection: California Becomes the 
Strictest Personal Data Regulator in the US 
The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) of 2018, effective in 2020, 
marks the first instance of a state adopting such broad and generalized data 
privacy regulation. 207 The legislature sought to provide its population with 
fundamental privacy rights not yet afforded by federal or other states’ laws.208 
Subsequently, in November 2020, California adopted the California Privacy 
Rights Act (CPRA) of 2020, which will broaden the privacy rights of Califor-
nians even more by 2023. 209 
Both the CCPA and CPRA read like pseudo-omnibus legislation, and both 
share vast similarities with the EU’s GDPR. 210 For example, both the CCPA 
and GDPR provide individuals with the right to obtain their data, to rec eive 
that data in a usable format, and to request that businesses delete that data.211 
                                                                                                          
2612, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2021) (providing the failed Mississippi Consumer Data Privacy 
Act). 
 206 See Leins, supra note 200 (crowning California as the best regulated state in the US). Alt-
hough Maine was not the highest ranked state, it was the only state to ban its police from using mobile 
data to monitor individuals’ locations. See id. (recognizing Maine as best regulated in this specific 
sector). 
 207 See Brian Hengesbaugh & Amy de la Lama, US State Omnibus Privacy Laws—A Primer,  
GLOB. COMPLIANCE NEWS (July 26, 2019), https://globalcompliancenews.com/us-state-omnibus-
privacy-laws-primer-20190703/ (suggesting that the CCPA was the initial step towards state omnibus 
laws in the US); Liens, supra note 200 (claiming that California has the highest caliber of privacy 
legislation in the US). See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.199.95 (Supp. 2021) (providing 
the CCPA, which gives Californians many additional means and assurances to better protect their 
data). 
 208 See California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF THE 
ATT’Y GEN., https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa [https://perma.cc/37KM-XQYM] (listing the addition of 
the “right to know,” “right to delete,” “right to opt-out,” and “right to non-discrimination” to Califor-
nians’ bundle of privacy rights). 
 209 See Brian H. Lam, California Privacy Rights Act Passes—Dramatically Altering the CCPA, 
NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/california-privacy-rights-act-
passes-dramatically-altering-ccpa [https://perma.cc/FHP5-Z7AZ] (discussing the success of Proposi-
tion 24 in California in November 2020, which will bring forth additional privacy rights by January 1, 
2023). The California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA) of 2020 includes provisions covering: (1) a new 
regulatory agency that will administrate the law; (2) an expansion of the scope of businesses required 
to comply; (3) a heightened standard to provide sufficient notice about collection; (4) carved o ut  
standards for more delicate and personal data; and (5) generally required stricter standards for those 
who collect, use, or process data. See id. (listing the ways that the CPRA will add to the CCPA). 
 210 See Hengesbaugh & de la Lama, supra note 207 (equating the CCPA to “omnibus” legisla-
tion). See generally Mark Smith, ANALYSIS: California Privacy Reboot Puts Rights in Spotlight ,  
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 15, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-
california-privacy-reboot-puts-rights-in-spotlight [https://perma.cc/YZ4Y-3K9R] (demonstrating the 
rights that the CPRA will add to the CCPA to make it even more reaching and similar to EU law). 
 211 See LAURA JEHL & ALAN FRIEL, CCPA AND GDPR COMPARISON CHART 4–5 (2018), https://
iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/CCPA_GDPR_Chart_PracticalLaw_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z276-UVVS] (comparing the provisions of the CCPA with the GDPR and drawing similarities be-
tween the rights to “access,” “portability,” and “deletion”). For example, both the CCPA and GDPR 
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Likewise, both pieces of legislation have the potential to affect entities outside 
of their natural jurisdictions. 212 In instances where the two laws differ, most 
often the GDPR is the stricter provision. 213 There are, nevertheless, some pro-
visions wherein the CCPA regulates data collection more than the EU does.214 
Because of these qualities, it is likely that California’s privacy regime is better 
suited than the US’s to meet the adequacy requirements set by the EU in 
Schrems II. 215 
III. WINNING THE BATTLE BY USING STATE-BASED  
ADEQUACY TO OVERCOME SCHREMS III 
Following the CJEU invalidating Privacy Shield in Data Protection 
Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Ltd. (Schrems II), in July 2020, the future 
of the transatlantic data trade and American adequacy is indeterminate. 216 
Schrems will undoubtedly continue to push back against any agreements made 
                                                                                                          
provide essentially the same provisions requiring entities to store data in a manner that makes it com-
patible and understandable if the user ever wishes to access it . Compare CIV.  §§ 1 7 9 8.10 0(d),  
1798.130(a)(2) (requiring businesses to reply to data requests with immediately utilizable responses), 
with Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 10, art. 20, at 45 (demanding that businesses send the data 
in a familiar and discernable form). 
 212 See CIV. § 1798.140(g) (providing the CCPA’s extraterritorial provision); Regulation (EU) 
2016/679, supra note 10, art. 4(1), at 33 (supplying the related provision from the GDPR). 
 213 Compare CIV. § 1798.105(d) (providing Californian businesses with discretion to deny an 
individual’s request to erase their data), with Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note 10, art. 17, at 43–
44 (allowing lit tle flexibility to entities with the right to erasure). One of the more significant differ-
ences where the GDPR is the more restrictive law is its “ legal basis” requirement. Umhoefer, supra 
note 107. The CCPA does not demand that businesses prove their legal ground for processing con-
sumer data. Id. 
 214 See, e.g., CIV. §§ 1798.120, 1798.135(a)–(b) (depicting an individual’s absolute “right to opt-
out” of having their data sold in California). Although the GDPR allows its citizens to opt-out of cer-
tain marketing and processing uses, it  does not provide Europeans with an absolute right to not partic-
ipate. See JEHL & FRIEL, supra note 211, at 4 (commenting on the dissimilarity between the opt-out 
provisions in the GDPR and the CCPA). See generally Regulation (EU) 2016/679, supra note  1 0 
(missing an all-inclusive opt out provision). On the other hand, the CCPA allows Californians to opt 
out of any sale of data. See CIV. §§ 1798.120, 1798.135(a)–(b) (requiring businesses to include an  
obvious way for users to forbid the business from selling their data with the phrase “Do Not Sell My 
Personal Information”). In addition, because the US has federal privacy legislation at both the state 
and federal levels, provisions that do not appear in state privacy laws could already receive protection 
from relevant federal legislation. See Maldoff & Tene, supra note 74, at 221 (describing the tiered 
levels of privacy law in the US). 
 215 See Maldoff & Tene, supra note 74, at 238–40 (suggesting that a sustainable adequacy deter-
mination must include: (1) understandable and available standards; (2) data minimization; (3) neutral 
supervision; and (4) an effective means to remedy violations). The court reasoned that the “essentially 
equivalent” requirement placed an obligation on states wishing to trade data with the EU to develop 
the proper data agencies required to safeguard information. Id. at 231. 
 216 Chiavetta, supra note 154; see Case C–311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook I r .  L td.  
(Schrems II), ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 201 (July 16, 2020). 
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with the US, effectively making a Schrems III case inevitable. 217 The EU and 
US should adopt a state-specific adequacy agreement because individual states 
are likely better suited to meet European standards than the federal government 
is. 218 Section A of this Part predicts the unavoidable reality of Schrems III, 
which necessitates the durability of a renegotiated transatlantic data trade 
mechanism. 219 Section B proposes and analyzes state-specific adequacy deter-
minations as a possible solution to not only defeat Schrems III, but also to cul-
tivate national adequacy over time. 220 
A. With “Schrems v. the Next Transatlantic Privacy Mechanism (Schrems 
III)” on the Horizon, the US Must Forge the Path to Victory 
The US must initiate a suitable compromise with the EU because it can-
not afford to lose Schrems III. 221 Although both parties have expressed that 
they are willing to develop a new transatlantic data transfer mechanism, the US 
has the greater incentive and capability to do so. 222 The US likely suffers more 
                                                                                                          
 217 See MILDEBRATH, supra note 12 (noting Schrems’ suggestion that the US completely change 
its surveillance regime to obtain adequacy from the EU); Our Detailed Concept, supra note 15 (sug-
gesting that Schrems, and his organization, will instigate litigation that would provoke the EU to as-
sess its privacy standards and relationships with other countries based on their regulations). At one 
point, Schrems went so far as to recommend that the best way to protect European data was to keep it 
within its jurisdiction. See Chander, supra note 110, at 771 (presenting Schrems’ proposal for a closed 
border approach to privacy regulation). Given the sheer amount of money tied to the transatlantic data 
trade, this is unlikely to ever occur. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Com., supra note 167 (stating 
that the international market produced trillions of dollars). Schrems, nevertheless, has pledged himself 
and his organization to seek legal recourse. See Our Detailed Concept, supra note 15 (pledging to  
bring challenges like those in Schrems I and Schrems II). Importantly, both Safe Harbor and Privacy 
Shield were defeated by complaints that did not directly challenge them. See generally Schrems II, 
ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 52–54 (stemming from a complaint about SCCs); Case C–362/14, Schrems 
v. Data Prot. Comm’r (Schrems I), ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶¶ 26–30, 35 (Oct. 6, 2015) (developing 
from a complaint about a commissioner’s refusal to stop a Facebook subsidiary from making transfers 
to the US). 
 218 See infra notes 232–260 and accompanying text. 
 219 See infra notes 221–231 and accompanying text. 
 220 See infra notes 232–260 and accompanying text. 
 221 See Nigel Cory et al., ‘Schrems II’: What Invalidating the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Means for 
Transatlantic Trade and Innovation, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (Dec. 3, 2020), https://itif.
org/publications/2020/12/03/schrems-ii-what-invalidating-eu-us-privacy-shield-means-transatlantic 
[https://perma.cc/3DM3-A4TA] (claiming that Schrems II will devastate thousands of American busi-
nesses). Ambiguity prevents businesses from trading data successfully. Id. The Schrems II decision 
put businesses at a significant risk to face harsh legal ramifications for misinterpreting the applicabil-
ity of other transfer mechanisms, like SCCs. See Hidalgo et al., supra note 163 (acknowledging that 
Privacy Shield was no longer a valid mechanism at the exact moment the CJEU released its decision 
on July 16, 2020); Swagerman, supra note 85 (pointing out the dramatic economic hit that a business 
may take if the GDPR fines it). 
 222 Compare Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Com., supra note 167 (expressing the US’s desire to 
find a compromise with the EU on transatlantic privacy transfers quickly and demonstrating that the 
US should be incentivized to make a replacement work during a time of economic uncertainty), with 
Press Statement, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 171 (stating Commissioner Reynders’ recognition that the 
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from Schrems II than the EU because the determination exclusively limits 
American businesses from profiting off of Europeans’ data. 223 Meanwhile, Eu-
ropean corporations can continue to process Americans’ data without re-
striction. 224 The inability to fully use and profit from data ultimately burdens 
the US’s economy, businesses, and citizens. 225 As the volume and profitability 
of personal data continue to grow over time, this harm will metastasize. 226 
The US is better suited than the EU to resolve that conflict for several 
reasons. 227 First, a national privacy structure ideally balances economic incen-
tives with security risks. 228 Second, the US faces both economic loss and insuf-
                                                                                                          
EU wished to continue its close relationship with the US in the data trade even after the Schrems II 
decision, but that it would not compromise its fundamental privacy values). 
 223 See Tony DeBos et al., What to Do Now That the EU-US Privacy Shield Framework Is Inva-
lid, EY (Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.ey.com/en_us/consulting/what-to-do-now-that- the-eu-us-
privacy-shield-framework-is-invalid [https://perma.cc/5P28-KV3N] (commenting on the dispropor-
tionate effect of the Schrems II decision between the EU and US); FAQs—EU-U.S. Privacy Shield 
Program Update, PRIV. SHIELD FRAMEWORK, https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=EU-U-S-
Privacy-Shield-Program-Update [https://perma.cc/SKE6-WT7J] (Mar. 31, 2021) (noting that Schrems 
II only limited the flow of data from the EU to the US). Although the decision put transatlantic data 
trade into question, the ability for an EU entity to collect, sell, or assess the data of a US citizen has 
never been brought into question. See FAQs—EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Program Update, supra (re-
flecting on the directional limitation imposed by the CJEU’s decisions). Thus, although the stifling of 
transfers affected both sides, the EU could hold a favorable bargaining position in any future negotia-
tion because Schrems II only limited data flow from the EU to the US. See id. (recognizing t hat 
Schrems II only stops US access to EU data). 
 224 See RACHEL F. FEFER & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF 10896, EU DATA PRO-
TECTION RULES AND IMPLICATIONS (9th version 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF1 089 6.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/7ZE6-G6MZ] (stating that the US does not limit the flow of its citizens’ dat a t o 
other countries). In 2018, the Bureau of Economic Analysis estimated that the EU traded $127 billion 
worth of data to the US. Id. The US nearly doubled that figure, trading $218 billion of data to the EU. 
Id. 
 225 See NORTH, supra note 25, at 14 (suggesting that, in part, the benefit that an individual gains 
from data collection requires the collector to amass the information to make macroscopic decisions); 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Com., supra note 167 (worrying about the harsh economic impact that 
Schrems II would have on the economy); Cory et al., supra note 221 (claiming that Privacy Shield 
was especially harmful to smaller companies because they do not have the funds to use other mecha-
nisms, like SCCs); see also MILDEBRATH, supra note 12 (presenting the argument that SCCs might 
only be plausible alternatives outside of the realities of US privacy and surveillance legisla t ion) ; 
Boardman et al., supra note 30 (concluding that substitutes to SCCs are even less sufficient of a solu-
tion). 
 226 See HURLEY, supra note 2, at 20 (proposing that data engulfs the world around us); Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Com., supra note 167 (estimating a $7.1 trillion, and growing, appraisal on the 
exchange of personal data between the EU and US). 
 227 See infra notes 228–231 and accompanying text. 
 228 See Hirsch, supra note 35, at 375 (demonstrating that privacy legislation has an inherent coun-
terbalance between the individual privacy and broader economic concerns). The US does not neces-
sarily strike the balance well. See Natasha Singer, The Government Protects Our Food and Cars. Why 
Not Our Data?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/02/sunday-review/
data-protection-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/MNE3-P7CR] (questioning why the US government 
chooses to better protect people from less-personal tangible harm, like discontinuing an unsafe tablet 
device, but not preventing fundamental intangible harm, like a privacy violation). 
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ficient data security in the wake of Schrems II, whereas the EU has properly 
compromised profit for the sake of protection.229 Moreover, the EU has made 
abundantly clear that it will not disregard its citizens’ personal security to make 
an agreement with the US work. 230 Accordingly, the US must find the way for a 
transatlantic data agreement to survive an inevitable challenge in the CJEU.231 
B. Brick by Brick, State by State: State-Based Adequacy as a  
Short-Term Fix to Propagate a Long-Term Solution 
State-based adequacy is the best solution for the transatlantic data trade to 
continue and flourish. 232 Although it may only be a short-term answer, the US 
needs a workable strategy to defeat Schrems III now. 233 Federal law does not 
have a privacy standard that is sufficient to produce an impenetrable adequacy 
determination from the EU. 234 Individual states that meet the EU’s standards 
should be allowed to negotiate state-based adequacy with the EU so that they 
can profit from transatlantic data. 235 Over time, state-specific adequacy will 
economically incentivize the collective US to meet EU adequacy standards,  
                                                                                                          
 229 See ACQUISTI, supra note 48, at 3 (stating that there should be some inherent compromise 
between the value of trade and the value of privacy in data regulation). See generally Case C–311/18, 
Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. (Schrems II), ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 (July 16, 2020) (limiting 
the amount of data that the US could collect, and therefore profit from, while also criticizing the US 
for having insufficient data privacy regulations). 
 230 See Press Statement, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 171 (noting Vice-President Jourová’s assurance 
that the EU policy will continue to favor protecting EU citizens’ data over finding a sufficient agreement 
with the US). As EU courts and the Commission have made clear, they will continue to put the personal 
security of their citizens above any argument for the economy. See Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, 
¶ 201 (eliminating a major mechanism for lucrative trade in the name of privacy protection); Press 
Statement, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 171 (indicating Vice-President Jourová’s concession that the 
court made the correct decision in Schrems II). 
 231 See Cory et al., supra note 221 (lamenting that businesses suffer when the US does not have 
clear-cut ways for its businesses to trade data abroad); Umhoefer & Serwin, supra note 159 (suggest-
ing that the Schrems II decision left businesses in an improperly difficult situation). 
 232 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Com., supra note 167 (commenting on the harm caused when 
the CJEU invalidated Privacy Shield). An unsuccessful outcome in Schrems III would likely hav e 
similar ramifications to those of Schrems II. See id. (dwelling on the economic complications that 
Schrems II caused). 
 233 See id. (labeling the transatlantic data trade as a $7.1 trillion market). 
 234 See Peter M. Lefkowitz, Opinion, Why America Needs a Thoughtful Federal Privacy Law, 
N.Y. T IMES (June 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/opinion/congress-privacy-law.
html [https://perma.cc/N73W-S2DL] (commenting that the US does not have strong federal data pri-
vacy laws and arguing in support of the US adopting such legislation). 
 235 See Andrea Little Limbago, DIY Data Protection: As Congress Stalls, States Take Charge, 
GCN (Mar. 23, 2020), https://gcn.com/articles/2020/03/23/states-lead-data-privacy-protections.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/VV2M-AKZM] (claiming that states are leading the way toward strong data privacy 
legislation in the US, while the federal government stands by the wayside). Although California is the 
current frontrunner in US data privacy legislation, many states follow closely behind it. See id. (claim-
ing that a majority of states made headway to improve their privacy regulations in 2019). 
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because states will improve their regulations to compete in the transatlantic  
data trade. 236 
Some of the more highly regulated US states may be individually capable 
of satisfying European standards. 237 The best example being California, which 
substantially heightened its state protections with the recent CCPA and oncom-
ing CPRA. 238 Although the Californian regulations do not create a carbon copy 
of the European model, they provide many similar protections. 239 In fact, the 
state’s data privacy standard structure is now more akin to the EU’s regime 
than the US’s and is better suited to the EU than any other state. 240 As noted by 
the CJEU, territories do not need to have an exact match to EU privacy regula-
tions for lawful data transfers to occur.241 Rather, they only need to have a sys-
tem that is fundamentally comparable to the European caliber for protection.242 
Even if state-based adequacy does not fully replace the need for a nation-
wide mechanism, it could facilitate a more comprehensive agreement in the 
future. 243 Several states already seem to follow California’s lead closely.244 By 
allowing individual states to pursue adequacy determinations from the Com-
                                                                                                          
 236 See Lefkowitz, supra note 234 (claiming that 7% of the entire US economy is based in tech-
nology and that portion is increasing quickly); Limbago, supra note 235 (showing that states take 
influence from other states’ privacy regulations to develop their own); N. Gregory Mankiw, Competi-
tion Is Healthy for Governments, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/
04/15/business/competition-is-good-for-governments-too-economic-view.html [https://perma.cc/
NDL5-ZAKJ] (proposing that governments improve when they compete with each other). 
 237 See Leins, supra note 200 (reflecting on the wide range of additional privacy r egulatio n 
among the states). 
 238 See California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), supra note 208 (addressing the recent umbrella 
privacy law in California that encompasses a wide majority of personal data and its use); see also  
Lam, supra note 209 (including the relevant additions that the CPRA will affect). 
 239 See generally JEHL & FRIEL, supra note 211 (noting some similarities and differences between 
the CCPA and GDPR). Both the CCPA and GDPR safeguard relatively similar types of persons and 
information. Id. But the right to “opt-out” diverges significantly between the two documents. Id. 
 240 See Lam, supra note 209 (adding even more “omnibus-esque” provisions to Californians’  
bundle of privacy rights); Umhoefer, supra note 107 (textualizing the common equation of the CCPA 
to the GDPR to show that, although very similar to the GDPR, the CCPA does not quite match its 
level of regulation); EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework Principles Issued by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, supra note 5 (differentiating the US from EU legislation because of its sectoral approach); 
see also California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), supra note 208 (stating the additional rights pro-
vided in the CCPA). See generally JEHL & FRIEL, supra note 211 (comparing the CCPA with t he  
GDPR to determine the similarities and less frequent differences). 
 241 See Case C–362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r (Schrems I), ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 73 
(Oct. 6, 2015) (requiring “essentially equivalent” protection for a country to be adequate to lawfully 
transfer data with the EU). 
 242 Id. 
 243 Jennifer Bryant, 2021 ‘Best Chance’ for US Privacy Legislation, IAPP (Dec. 7, 2021), https://
iapp.org/news/a/2021-best-chance-for-federal-privacy-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/3Q3W-Z5SR] 
(predicting that US privacy standards will change in 2021 because the new executive leadership may 
try to follow the states’ thrust towards stricter regulations). 
 244 See US State Privacy Legislation Tracker: Bills Introduced 2021, supra note 201 (noting the 
later passed legislation in Colorado and California and a list  of similar pending privacy bills). 
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mission, the US would create an economic incentive for all states to improve 
their local privacy regulations. 245 Over time, additional states would likely 
adopt pseudo-omnibus legislation similar to California’s to allow their busi-
nesses to participate in the transatlantic trade more confidently. 246 As  more 
states augment their own standards, it would then become easier for the US to 
raise the federal floor to a suitable level. 247 
Some argue, however, that the US should adopt national umbrella legisla-
tion to pacify the tension between the EU and US privacy frameworks.248 As 
US data breaches become more dangerous and prevalent than ever, the desire 
to protect personal information broadly has intensified. 249 Federal omnibus  
                                                                                                          
 245 See Kennedy, supra note 51 (noting the tremendous profit that a business can gain by compet-
ing in the data market). 
 246 See Limbago, supra note 235 (suggesting that most states are following the guidance of priva-
cy leaders, like California, to adopt their own pseudo-omnibus legislation in a trend toward height-
ened protection); see also Christopher DeMuth, Competition and the Constitution, NAT’ L  AFFS.  
(2011), https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/competition-and-the-constitution [https://
perma.cc/BWB2-UQRC] (concluding that competition is an important policy consideration, as well as 
is a fundamental component of human nature). Competition is everywhere. See DeMuth, supra (pro-
posing that people experience genetic competition in their DNA, social competition in their relation-
ships with others, and material competition in their resources); see also Malcolm H. Dunn, Do Na-
tions Compete Economically? A Critical Comment on Prof. Krugman’s Essay “Competitiveness: A 
Dangerous Obsession,” 29 INTERECONOMICS 303, 304–06 (1994), https://www.econsto r.eu/bit
stream/10419/140477/1/v29-i06-a07-BF02928169.pdf [https://perma.cc/SY5Q-YYAA] (explaining 
that there is a benefit to inter-jurisdictional economic competition). Regardless of whether competition 
among the states is beneficial, it is likely to occur, meaning that they will likely compete for better 
privacy standards if incentivized. See Dunn, supra, at 304–06 (proposing an alternative line of think-
ing to another professor’s proposal that national competition is bad). And, if pseudo-omnibus legisla-
tion was incentivized, other states would undoubtedly pursue it. See generally DeMuth, supra (sug-
gesting that rivalry could drive legislative choices). 
 247 See MILDEBRATH, supra note 12 (reasoning that revamping federal law is currently impracti-
cal given the overall privacy regime of the US and its states). States only possess the power to provide 
their constituents with privacy regulations that are stricter and agreeable with those afforded by the 
federal government. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (giving precedent to any federal law over conflict-
ing state law); Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 7 6 7,  77 0 
(1994) (explaining that states can still regulate in the same area as a federal law so long as its provi-
sions do not conflict with those of the supreme document). Thus, states that do not choose to regulate 
beyond the federal floor can clamp down on their ability to easily change. See MILDEBRATH, supra 
note 12 (demonstrating that it would be far-fetched for the federal government to reconstruct the US 
privacy standard). If states, however, each elevated their protection above the baseline, the federal 
government could raise its standard to match stricter state laws with more ease, rather than having to 
hoist up all fifty states itself. Id. 
 248 See Tanith L. Balaban, Comprehensive Data Privacy Legislation: Why Now Is the Time, 1 
CASE W. RSRV. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 30 (2009) (claiming that the US can and should enact om-
nibus legislation because it  would comport with American principles); Candice L. Kline, Comment, 
Security Theater and Database-Driven Information Markets: A Case for an Omnibus U.S. Data Pri-
vacy Statute, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 443, 494–95 (2008) (arguing in favor of the US adopting omnibus 
legislation to rectify data privacy fallacies made in response to 9/11). 
 249 See Carol Li, Note, A Repeated Call for Omnibus Federal Cybersecurity Law, 94 NO TRE 
DAME L. REV. 2211, 2233 (2019) (noting that the level of data insecurity in the US is so pervasive 
that individuals often must become complacent and accepting of businesses that violate their privacy). 
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legislation, therefore, often appears to be the obvious way to meet EU stand-
ards and change the reality of cybersecurity in the US. 250 But, this approach is 
not currently realistic because the US’s regulatory framework is too fragment-
ed. 251 The US has neither the resources nor the willingness to execute the de-
gree of modernization necessary to completely restructure the national frame-
work in the near future. 252 In fact, Schrems III will certainly occur before the 
US could practically adopt an omnibus law. 253 
A ‘state-based adequacy now, national adequacy over time’ approach 
could also alleviate the EU’s concern for US surveillance practices.254 The EU 
will undoubtedly continue to scrutinize US security programs and regula-
tions. 255 But, the recent trend by states to tighten data privacy regulations has 
sparked Congress to develop a national data privacy authority that could even-
tually limit federal surveillance programs. 256 Besides, state advances could 
                                                                                                          
 250 See id. at 2234–39 (arguing that an omnibus privacy law in the US could protect the safety of 
citizens, the goodwill of businesses, the ability for smaller entities to remain profitable, and holistical-
ly raise the bar for the protection of information nationwide). Some have even presented drafts o f  
potential omnibus legislation that the US could use if it decided to enact an omnibus law. See general-
ly Scot Ganow & Sam S. Han, Model Omnibus Privacy Statute, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 345 (2010) 
(drafting an example of one way that the US could structure an umbrella law based on a survey of the 
current sectoral federal statutes and their protections). 
 251 See MILDEBRATH, supra note 12 (reciting the US’s response that it could not actually adopt 
the recommendations made by the EU and Schrems); Voss, supra note 29, at 410 (commenting on the 
structural conflict between EU and US data privacy frameworks). 
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quell this apprehension, even without the ability to displace federal legislation.257 
Individual states are removed from the federal government’s complete control, 
and could therefore develop truly autonomous ombudspersons to address priva-
cy complaints brought by Europeans.258 Each state could reconcile any remain-
ing surveillance concerns while negotiating adequacy with the Commission to 
guarantee its approval. 259 And with each state that moved the US towards a na-
tional omnibus standard, the EU’s uneasiness would necessarily shrink. 260 
CONCLUSION 
The transatlantic trade of personal information is critical to the EU and 
US economies. Although recent technological advances make the access to and 
usability of personal information incredibly profitable, the dissemination of 
highly individualized information raises substantial concern for the privacy 
rights of individuals. Because the EU and the US have weighed these consid-
erations differently in their privacy regimes, they have struggled to trade data 
with each other. 
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To remedy these differences, the EU and the US have tried to negotiate 
mechanisms that allow the US to obtain the requisite “adequacy” determina-
tion to make lawful data transfers with European entities in Safe Harbor and 
Privacy Shield. The CJEU struck both down, respectively, with Schrems v. Da-
ta Protection Commissioner (Schrems I), in 2015, and Data Protection Com-
missioner v. Facebook Ireland Ltd. (Schrems II), in 2020. The court cited the 
US’s insufficient privacy protections to disallow these data transfers. 
The US, however, is unlikely to nationally meet the strict and high stand-
ards set by the EU before there is a Schrems III challenge. Instead, certain in-
dividual states, like California, should negotiate state-specific adequacy. Over 
time, more states will likely raise their own privacy regulations to seek ade-
quacy as well. Eventually, this shift will help the federal government to elevate 
its standard and earn a nationwide adequacy determination from the EU to 
guarantee the transatlantic data privacy trade. 
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